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JOHN R. BOYCE & MATS A.N. NILSSON'

Interest Group Competition and the
Alaska Native Land Claims Settlement
Act
ABSTRACT
This article examines the competition among three main sets of
interest groups during the struggle to resolve the Native land
claims issue: the Natives, the development interests (oil companies
and the state of Alaska) and conservation interests (environmentalists and the Departmentof Interior). We examine the history of the
Native land claims struggle as it was waged in the courts and in
Congress,paying particularattentionto the behavior of the various
interest groups as they competed against one another. We also
conduct an analysis of the voting behavior in the United States
House of Representatives,where roll call voting data is availablefor
votes on amendments in which the conservationand development
interests had clear objectives. From both the historicaland econometric voting analysis, we found that environmentalistsand the oil
industry significantlyaffected the finalform of the Alaska Native
Claims Settlement Act.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971 (ANCSA) settled
land claims by approximately 55,000 Alaskan Natives (Inupiat, Yupik,
Aleuts, Athabascan, Tlingit, and Haida Indians),' enabled development of
the oil fields in Prudhoe Bay, and set the stage for the largest conservation
withdrawals in United States history. The Native land claims arose in 1867,
when the United States purchased Alaska from Russia. In addition to
granting the Natives 40 million acres of land and $962.5 million for
* Boyce, Department of Economics, University of Calgary, Canada; Nilsson, Division
of Economics, Lulel University of Technology, Sweden. The authors thank Francine Davis for
research assistance and Kristin Potter for editorial assistance. This research was begun while
the authors were assistant professor and graduate student, respectively, at the University of
Alaska, Fairbanks, U.S.A.
1. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 USC. §§ 1601-1629 (1994).
2. We follow the Alaska convention of capitalizing the word "Native" to distinguish
it from "native" Alaskans, where the latter includes all people who have lived in Alaska a
generation or more. However, in some quotations, the lower case "native" is taken to mean
"Native." See RosEiRT D. ARNOLD, iT AL., ALAS A NATIVE LAND CLAIMS 9 (1978) (for a map

showing the geographic distribution of the Alaskan Natives as well as the various divisions

within each group).
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extinguished land claims 3 ANCSA also withdrew 80 million acres of land
for later inclusion in parks, wildlife refuges, and wilderness areas.4 Each of
these withdrawals took precedence over remaining land selections granted
to Alaska under the Alaska Statehood Act of 1958.5
From its purchase in 1867 to statehood in 1959, Alaska was
managed by the federal government as a territorial possession of the
United States. Those in the Alaskan statehood movement hoped that
recognition of Alaska as a state would promote local control over natural
resources and foster economic growth.6 In order to allow for such growth,
the Alaska Statehood Act of 1958 provided the newly formed state of
Alaska the right to withdraw over 103 million acres of land (out of 375
million acres total) from federal public lands.' Alaska could then decide
how this land was to be developed. In 1959 there were about 270 million
acres from which the state could make its selections. In 1966, after the state
had selected about one quarter of its total land grant, Stewart L Udall, the
Secretary of the Department of Interior, imposed a "freeze" on further state
land selections pending resolution of Native land claims. After the passage
of ANCSA, Alaska was allowed to complete its selections, but the land
from which it could choose its remaining 80 million acres had shrunk from
the 270 million acres provided in the original Statehood grant, to about 125
million acres. Although Alaska successfully convinced the federal
government to withdraw an 800 mile pipeline corridor in ANCSA, this
concession came at a price, because the Department of Interior (DOI) was
placed in charge of managing the pipeline corridor, and construction on the
corridor did not begin until 1973, following the passage of the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline Act.

3. The largest cash settlement to any Indian tribe prior to ANCSA had been a $29.1
million settlement to the Indians of California. See Alaska Land Claims, XXVI CONG. Q.
ALMANAC 767,767 (1970).
4. Congress ratified the withdrawals in the Alaska National Interest Lands
Conservation Act, Pub. L No. 96-487,94 Stat. 2371 (1980) (codified, as amended, in scattered
sections of 16 U.S.C. & 43 US.C.).
5. Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L No. 85-508,72 Stat. 339 (1958).
6. During the statehood debates, the House Interior Committee reported a bill that
would have allowed Alaska to select 182 million acres of land. See CLAUS-M. NASKE &
HEMAN E SwOTnX, ALASKA: A HWORY OF THE 49TH STAT 156 (1987). However, this was
amended on the floor to the 103 million acres finally granted. Id. By way of comparison,
Alaska was given a land grant equalling about 27.9 percent of the total area. Id. at 157. In
percentage terms this ranks seventh (Florida received a grant of 64.3 percent of its land area).
Id.
7. At the time of statehood, approximately 1.5 million acres were in private hands. Thus,
the State total grant was 1045 million acres. It was the fact that such a small percentage of
land was available for private development that led supporters of statehood to call for, and
Congress to accept, the large State land selection. Id.
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This article examines the competition among three sets of interest
groups during the struggle to resolve the Native land claims issue: the
Natives, the development interests (oil companies and the state of Alaska)
and conservation interests (environmentalists and the DOI). The Native
interests included obtaining a land settlement and being adequately
compensated for lands lost.' The development interests had two main
objectives; first, to build a trans-Alaska pipeline connecting the huge oil
field discovered in 1968 at Prudhoe Bay with a deep water port; and
second, to complete the statehood land selections. The conservation
interests hoped to prevent the State from obtaining any more land before
conservation area withdrawals." The DOI saw the Native land claims as a
means of reestablishing its claim as manager of both lands held in trust for
the Natives and the conservation withdrawals."'
Our analysis is two part. First, we examine the history of the
Native land claims struggle as it was waged in the courts and Congress,
paying particular attention to the behavior of the various interest groups
as they competed against one another. Then, we turn to a statistical
analysis of three United States House of Representatives' votes on ANCSA.
By analyzing roll call voting data, we attempt to determine the effect the
Native, conservation, and development forces had on the legislation. In
particular, we focus on an amendment sponsored by Representatives
Morris K. Udall (D-AZ) " and John P. Saylor (R-PA) that would have
increased the size of the so-called "d(2)" conservation lands withdrawn

8. Consider the statement of Richard Frank, Mayor of the Native village of Minto: "As
long as I'm chief, we won't give up our land. We have the same idea the state has. The state
wants to develop this land and that's our aim, too." MARY CLAY BERRY, THE ALASKA PIPLINE
THE PoLmcs OF OIL AND NATIVE LAND CLAIMS 37 (1975).

9. Representative John P. Saylor (R-PA), an opponent of the bill without land use
planning amendments, stated that ANCSA "offers a splendid opportunity not only to obtain
social justice for the Alaska Natives, but an opportunity to provide for the wise use of
Alaska's resources through comprehensive land use planning. Adoption of comprehensive
land use planning amendments would serve the Nation, Alaska, and the Native people better
by avoiding the mistakes of the past and achieve for all
the environmental goals of all
Americans." H.R. REP. No. 92-523, at 56 (1971) reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2192,2246. See
also Hon. Thomas R.Berger, Conflict in Alaska, 28 NAT. RESUXW J.37 (1988).
10. The DOI was already the manager of all vacant, unappropriated, and unreserved
lands in Alaska. See Alaska Land Claims, Pipeline, XXV CONG. Q. ALMANAC 543,544 (1969).

However, their management authority was greatly limited on those lands. This would not be
the case if the lands were withdrawn for conservation purposes or held in trust by the DOI
for the Alaska Natives. We are thus proposing that the DOI acted in a manner consistent with
a budget maximizing bureau. See genezllyj WUAM A.

NSKANEN, JR.,
OFFICE OF MANAGEMNT

&BuDGET, BUREAUcRAcY AND REPREsENrATivE GOVERNMENT (1971).
11. Brother of Stewart L Udall, Secretary of the Interior.
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from 80 million acres to over 125 million acres.? Although this amendment
failed, if adopted it would have limited Alaska's land choices to 80 million
acres, leaving the State with no choice at all.13
I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

This section gives a detailed history of the Alaska Native land
claims dispute. We begin by discussing the concept of Indian title in the
context of Alaskan legal history. Next, we analyze how the Alaska
Statehood Act complicated Native land claims. We conclude by examining
the legislative history of ANCSA, paying particular attention to the
interactions among the Natives, the development interests (the State and
the oil companies), and the conservation interests (the environmentalists
and the 0I).
A. Indian Title in Alaska: From the "Treaty of Cession" to Alaskan
Statehood
The concept of Indian (or aboriginal) title originated in the Spanish
conquests of the Americas. Forty years after Columbus' discovery,
Francisco de Vitoria advised Charles V, grandson of Ferdinand and
Isabella, that as inheritor of the Spanish Empire he was the sovereign
owner of the newly discovered lands. However, Vitoria also advised
Charles V that the Indians "were entitled to remain undisturbed in the
possession of their lands," and that only the sovereign could negotiate the
surrender of Indian title."' This principle of Indian title was adopted and

12. The "d(2)" name is in reference the section of ANCSA in which the withdrawals
occur. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 92-203, § 17(d)(2) 85 Stat. 688, 709-10
(1971) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1610 (1994)).
13. The total land area in Alaska is approximately 375 million acres. See NASKE &
SLOTCK, supra note 6, at 158. There were approximately 95 million acres withdrawn at the
time of statehood and an additional 10 million acres withdrawn by the federal government
prior to ANCSA being passed. See id.Add to this the 40 million acres selected by the Natives
(not all of which had priority over the State selections) and the 26 million acres already
selected by the State. This leaves approximately 205 million acres. Subtracting the 77 million
acres that the State was allowed to select leaves approximately 125 million acres. Thus, if the
Udall-Saylor amendment had passed, the State would have been left with only the lands not
selected by either the federal government or the Natives. As it was, the State land choices
were reduced from 270 million acres from which to choose 103 million acres (2.7 acres from
which to choose each acre) to 125 million acres from which to choose the final 77 million acres
(1.6 acres to choose each acre).
14. W.C. ARNOLD, NATivE LAND CLAIMS iN ALAsKA 4 (1967) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the University of New Mexico School of Law Library).
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refined in the seminal case, Johnson v. M'Intosh.'5 In this case, Chief Justice
Marshall reasoned that discovery granted the discoverers exclusive title,
subject only to the Indians' right of occupancy.16 Thus, Indians could
transfer their right of occupancy only with the permission of the federal
government.17 Furthermore, later courts extended the rationale of Johnson
by holding that if the federal government did not recognize Indian title,
then the taking of Indian land was not compensable under the Fifth
Amendment.'
The United States purchased Alaska from Russia for seven million
dollars in the Treaty of Cession signed March 30, 1867. "' Secretary of State
William H. Seward offered to increase the purchase price by $200,000 if
Russia would guarantee title against all potential claims by Russian
citizens. The Russian Ambassador to the United States, Baron Eduard de
Stoeckel, agreed.20 Regarding Indian title, Article III of the Treaty of Cession
states, "The uncivilized tribes will be subject to such laws and regulations
as the United States may, from time to time, adopt in regard to aboriginal
tribes of that country.""' The first of these laws was the Organic Act of
1884,'2 which states, "[T]he Indians or other persons in said district shall
not be disturbed in the possession of any lands actually in their use or
occupation or now claimed by them but the terms under which such
persons may acquire title to such lands is reserved for future legislation by

15. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
16. Seeid.at576-77.
17. This principle was reinforced in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (1 Pet.) 515, 559-60
(1832) in which Justice Marshall ruled that states could not transfer Indian title. See ARNOLD,
supra note 14, at xiv-xvi, 2-10; DAVID S. CASE, ALASKA NATIVA AND AMERICAN LAWS 48-52
(1984); FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 53-57,486-87 (1982 ed., Rennard

Strickland et al., eds, 1982) (for discussions of aboriginal title).
18. See Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S.272,288 (1955). See also ARNOLD,
supranote 14, at 56; CAsE, supra note 17, at 66.
19. Treaty of Cession, Mar. 30,1867, U.S.-Russia, 15 Stat. 539. Ratification would come
on May 28,1867. See id. The Senate voted 32-7 in favor of the treaty. See CASE, supra note 17,

at 56. The United States took possession on October 18,1867, although it would be until July
18, 1868, that the United States House would vote to appropriate the money to pay the

Russians. See NASKE & SLOTNICK, supra note 6, at 65.
20.

See ARNOLD, supranote 14, at 12. The relevant clause reads:

The cession of territory and dominion herein made is hereby declared to be
free and unencumbered by any reservations, privileges, franchises, grants or
possessions, by any associated companies, whether corporate or incorporate,
Russian or any other, or by any parties, except merely private individual

property holders; and the cession hereby made, conveys all the rights,
franchises, and privileges now belonging to Russia in the said territory or
dominion, and appurtenances thereto.
Art. VI, 15 Stat. at 542-43.
21.
22.

Art. 1m, 15 Stat at 542.
Act of May 17,1884, ch.53,23 Stat. 24.
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Congress." 3 Thus, Congress acknowledged the Alaskan Natives' rights of
occupancy, but neither denied nor recognized any other rights.
The question of Indian title in Alaska was addressed by both the
United States Congress and the judiciary. The first court case in Alaska to
consider Indian title was Sutter v. Heckman7? In this case, Heckman
challenged the validity of Sutter's title to land he had purchased from the
Natives. The district court found that the Organic Act, in guaranteeing
"possession of any lands actually in their use," also allowed Indian
occupants the right to convey such title.' The Ninth Circuit Court affirmed,
but on grounds unrelated to Indian title.' Four years later the holding in
Sutter was overturned in United States v. Berrigan.I In this case the federal
government sought to enjoin gold miners from purchasing Indian land at
the headwaters of the Little Delta River. The court noted that the Organic
Act stated that only Congress, not individual Indians, could transfer title.'
This interpretation was upheld in United States v. Cadzow,' a case in which
the federal government again sought to enjoin a private transfer of Indian
land in Fort Yukon. In both Berrigan and Cadzow the court interpreted the
Organic Act as "merely supporting the authority of the federal government
to protect aboriginal occupancy." 3
Having reserved the right to recognize or deny Indian title, the
federal government made four mostly ineffectual statutory attempts to
recognize Indian Title in Alaska:31 the Native Allotment Act of 1906, the

23. § 8, 23 Stat. at 26.
24. Sutter v. Heckman, 1 Alaska 188 (D. Alaska 1901) afd, 119 F. 83 (9th Cir. 1902).
25. Id. at 199.
26. See Sutter v. Heckman, 119 F. 83 (9th Cir. 1902).
27. United States v. Berrigan, 2 Alaska 442 (D. Alaska 1905).
28. See id. at 448.
29. United States v. Cadzow, 5 Alaska 125 (D. Alaska 1914).
30. CASe, supra note 17, at 64. However, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found
in Worthen Lumber Mills v. Alaska Juneau GoldMining Co. that neither Natives nor non-Natives
were deprived of rights they had "theretofore possessed." Worthen Lumber Mills v. Alaska
Juneau Gold Mining Co., 229 F. 966,969 (9th Cir. 1916). In this interpretation, Natives and
non-Natives required that Congress recognize title. Similar reasoning is found in Miller v.
United States. Miller v. United States, 159 F.2d 997 (9th Cir. 1947). There the Ninth Circuit
found that the Treaty of Cession extinguished Indian title and that the Organic Act
constituted "congressional recognition of the occupancy or possession of the land by the
[individual] 'Indians' who were on the land at the time the act of 1884 was passed." Id. at

1,005.
31. See W.W. KEELER, Er AL-, REPORT To THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR BY THE TAsK
FORCE ON ALASKA NATIVE AFFAwRS 55-71 (1962) [hereinafter TASK FORCEl; ARNOLD, uT AL,
supra note 2, at 81; Alaska Native Land Claims: Hearingson S. 2906, S. 1964, S. 2690, S. 2020
Before the Senate Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 90th Cong. 66-74 (1968) (William L.
Hensley, What Rights to Land Have the Alaskan Natives?) thereinafter Hearings1968).
32. Act of May 17,1906, Pub. L. No. 171, ch. 2469,34 Stat. 197.
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Native Townsite Act of 1926,P an amendment to the Indian Reorganization
Act of 1934, ' and the Indian Claims Commission Act of 19 46 .0 The Native
Allotment Act of 1906 granted "restricted title" to 160 acres of public
domain to individual adult Natives. Restricted title meant that the land was
held in trust for the Natives by the DOL' Prior to 1930, the 160 acres of
land could be used seasonally (e.g., for fishing or hunting camps).
However, in 1930 the DOI began to require "continuous use and occupancy
[of these lands by Natives] for a period of five years. " " With this impractical requirement in place, only 100 grants of title allotments were patented
through 1962.
The Native Townsite Act of 1926" allowed Natives the option of
obtaining restricted title on the entire village, or fee simple title on the lots
upon which they lived. If the title were fee simple, vacant lots in the village
could be sold to non-Natives. Pursuant to this act, the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) granted Natives restricted title, but sold vacant lots to
non-Natives. The Natives and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), which
administered Native villages created under the act, protested these sales.
In 1955 the Alaska regional DOI solicitor issued an opinion stating that no
villages had been surveyed under the restricted title portion of the 1926 act.
However, this was reversed in an opinion by the deputy solicitor for the
DOI.As a result, by 1962 only 31 townsites had been surveyed under the
act, and an additional 69 were pending.'
The main avenue for recognizing Indian title was through the
establishment of reservations. Two were created by statute (Metlakatla in
1891 and Klukwan in 1957), about 150 were created by executive order
prior to 1919 (when this presidential right was revoked), and five "public
purpose reserves" were also created by executive order between 1919 and
1933.41 Seven reservations (totaling 1.5 million acres) were created under

33. Act of May 25,1926, Pub. L.No. 280, ch.379,44 Stat. 629,629-30.
34. Act of May 1, 1936, Pub. L No. 538, ch. 254,49 Stat. 1250, 1250-51 (codified at 25
US.C. § 473a (1994)).
35. Indian Claims Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 687, ch. 907,60 Stat. 939 (1946) (codified
at 25 US.C §§ 70-70w) (§ 70-70v omitted on Sept. 30,1978 when the commission terminated
pursuant to § 23,60 Stat. 1049,1055 (1946)) (@70w repeated by Act of May 4,1949, ch. 139, §
142, 62 Stat. 109).
36. This meant that the approval of the Secretary of the Interior was required to sell or
lease the land. See ARNOLD, Er AL, supranote 2, at 81.
37. TASK FORCE, supra note 31, at 59.

38. See id. at 60.
39. Act of May 25,1926, Pub. L No. 289, ch.379,44 Stat. 629,630. This act amended an
earlier act of 1891, which applied to both Native and non-Natives. Act of Mar. 3,1891, ch.561,
§ 11, 26 Stat. 1095,1099-1100.
40.
41.

See TASK FORCE, supra note 31, at 61.
See CASE, supra note 17, at 97-98,117n.31.
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the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,' which was amended in 19360 to
include Alaska. An additional 80 villages applied for reservation status by
1950, requesting 100 million acres of land, but no action was taken.'
In 1946 Congress established the Indian Claims Commission to
provide Indian claimants throughout the United States the standing to
bring suit against the United States government. All suits were to be
brought before the Commission by 1951. This act was generally used by
tribes in the lower 48 states to dispute lost lands.46 Thus, only 12 Alaskan
villages filed claims with the Commission.' Although all of these claims
were brought in a timely manner, none of them had been heard by 1962.
This delay was due, in part, to the Commission's desire to postpone
making any decisions until a relevant case in the court of claims, concerning Tlingit and Haida lands, was adjudicated.
Two postwar cases further complicated Alaska Native land claims.
In Miller v. United States, the Tlingit argued that the federal government
owed them compensation for condemnation proceedings that deprived
them of their lands.4 The federal government argued that since the Organic
Act gave the Natives, at best, an unrecognized title, they were not owed
compensation for loss of property under the Fifth Amendment.' While the
Ninth Circuit Court interpreted the Organic Act as having extinguished
aboriginal title generally, it found that the Act had not extinguished individual title.5 Thus, the court held that the Tlingit were owed compensation!'
However, the effect of this decision was almost immediately overturned by
the Supreme Court in Tee-Hit-Ton v. United States.'2 In this case the Tee-HitTon sought compensation for timber taken from the Tongass National
Forest. The Court held that the Organic Act did not grant the Tee-Hit-Ton
Indians "any permanent rights in the lands of Alaska occupied by them,"
and since their rights were unrecognized, they were not compensable
under the Fifth Amendment. s3 Thus, the legal status of Natives' Indian title
in Alaska at the time of statehood was dependent upon action by the
federal government. Unless they had obtained statutory recognition

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,25 U.S.C. §§ 416-479 (1994).
See Act of May 1,1936, Pub. L. No. 538, ch. 254,49 Stat. 1250.
See 49 Stat. at 1250-51.
See ARNOLD, ET AL, supra note 2, at 88.
See COHEN, supranote 17, at 160-62.
See TASK FORCE, supranote 31, at 65.
Miller v. United States, 159 F.2d 997,998 (9th Cir. 1947).
See id. at 999.
See id. at 1,001,1,003.
See id. at 1,006.
Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
Id. at 278, 285, 290.
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subsequent to the Organic Act, Alaska Natives held "unrecognized" rights,
and, as such, they were not owed compensation for any losses.
B. The Alaska Statehood Act of 1958 and the "Land Freeze" of 1966
The Alaska Statehood Act of 1958' allowed the State to select
102,550,000 acres from "vacant, unappropriated and unreserved lands,"
plus an additional 400,000 acres of "vacant and unappropriated" lands
from National Forest and other public lands,%which may include National
Wildlife Refuge areas upon approval by the Secretary of Interior. State land
selections could not include land currently in reservations, townsites,
national parks, national monuments, military reservations, or the land
consisting of Naval Petroleum Reserve No. Four. These exceptions totaled
about 95 million acres in 1958. 6 Alaska was also precluded from choosing
from over one million acres of land withdrawn for military reservations in
1961, s" and the 8.96 million acres reserved for the Rampart Dam on the
Yukon River in 1963. The total amount of land from which the state could
choose was about 270 million acres, and only about 40 million acres were
believed to be commercially valuable.' Additionally, the Statehood Act
also prohibited Alaska from claiming Native lands:
As a compact with the United States said State and its people
do agree and declare that they forever disclaim all right and
title.. .to any lands or other property (including fishing
rights) the right or title to which may be held by any Indians,
Eskimos, or Aleuts (hereinafter called natives) or is held by
the United States in trust for said natives..."
By 1969 Alaska had selected 26 million acres, had received patent
on 5.8 million acres, and had received tentative approval on an additional
7.9 million acres of land.'

54. Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508,72 Stat. 339 (1958).
55. See §§ 6(a) 6(b) 72 Stat. at 340.
56. See Alaska Land Claims, XXVI CONG. Q. ALMANAC 767, 768 (1970). See GEORGE W.
RoGERs, THE FuruREOF ALASKA: EcONONMc CONSEQuENCES OF STATEHOOD 52 (1962) (claims
there were about 9 million acres in Wildlife Refuges withdrawals in 1960 that were dearly
designed to limit State land selections in those areas).
57. See ROGERS, supra note 56, at 53.
58. See Alaska Land Claims, XXVI CONG. Q. ALMANAC 767,768 (1970).

59. Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 4,72 Stat. 339,339 (1958).
60. See S. REP. No. 91-925, at 79 (1970). But see S. REP. No. 92-405, at 96 (1971) (which
claimed a total acreage of 19.6 million acres selected, tentatively approved 8.5 million acres
and patented over 6.0 million acres). The 1970 report cites as its source STATE OF ALASKA DEP'T

OF NATURAL REsouRCFS, PuB. No.4, VOL XI, AuSKA LAND LNES (1970). The 1971 report does
not cite a source.
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Despite the expressed prohibition against laying claim to Native
lands, conflict arose as early as 1961 when Alaska attempted to select lands
in the Minto Flats area. At the prompting of the BIA, the Native village of
Minto filed a protest with the BLM concerning 1.75 million acres of land
that was part of an Alaska land selection totaling 5.86 million acres. The
DOI, which oversaw both the BLM and the BIA, ordered the BLM to
dismiss the village -of Minto's protest unless the land in question was
actually occupied by Natives.
In February 1962 the DOI's regional solicitor issued an opinion
stating that all Indian title protest decisions must be made on a determination of facts. As a result, the BLM ordered its Alaska offices to dismiss all
outstanding protests. These decisions were appealed to the director of the
BLM, and in early 1963 it was determined that all Alaska land claim
protests should be sent directly to the BLM director's office in Washington,
D.C.6 1' Additionally, the Natives sent a petition to Secretary Udall requesting that he stop all land selections by the State. The DOI did not respond.'
In fact, for over three years the DOI ignored Alaska Native protests
regarding land claims, and by 1966 about 122 million acres of land were
under protest by Native claims, with the largest claim by the Arctic Slope
Native Association for 58 million acres.' Only about 4.5 million acres of the
Native land claims overlapped with State selections."
In October 1966, at a meeting in Fairbanks, Alaska, a number of
Native groups joined together to form the Alaska Federation of Natives

61. See NASKE & SLOTNICK, supra note 6, at 197. See also BERRY, supra note 8, at 34-37;
ARNOLD, ElTAL, supranote 2, at 100-01.
62. See ARNOLD, ET AL., supra note 2, at 102.
63. See ARNOLD, ETAL, sup note 2, at 111. There were several serious threats to Native

land claims other than the State land selections. One involved a plan by the Atomic Energy
Commission to use an atomic bomb to excavate a harbor at Cape Thompson. See id. at 94-95;
NASKE & SLOTNICK, supra note 6, at 193-96; PETER A. COATES, THE TRANS-ALASKA PIPELINE

CONTROVERSY: TECHNOLOGY, CONSERVATION, AND THE FRONTIER 111-33 (1993). See generally
DANIEL T. O'NEILL, THE FIRECRACKER BOYS (1994). This idea was quashed after many years of
protest by a coalition of Native and environmental groups. A second threat involved building
a dam on the Yukon River near the village of Rampart which was expected to create a lake
larger than Lake Erie. See BERRY, supra note 8, at 42-43; ARNOLD, ET AL, supra note 2, at 102-03;

NASKE & SOrNCIC, supra note 6, at 197-98; COATES, at 111-33; O'NEILL, at 270-71. The United
States Fish and Wildlife Service said of the latter, "nowhere in the history of water

development in North America have the fish and wildlife losses anticipated to result from a
single project been so overwhelming." NASKE & SLOICIC, supra note 6, at 198. The latter

project was still being considered in 1966 and was a reason for many Native land selections.
It is interesting to note that both of these were federal projects, although neither was

supported by the DOI.
64. State land selections totalled about 17.5 million acres of land. See Vast Wealth Could
Await State Tribes, ANCHORAGE DAILY TIMES, Oct. 14,1966, at 1-2; Native Group Enters Claim
to Big Tract, ANCHORAGE DAILY TIMES, Jan. 17,1967, at 1-2.
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(AFN). The AFN adopted a resolution that urged the DOI to withdraw all
lands in dispute from State land selections. This resolution also asked
Congress to grant the United States Court of Claims jurisdiction over
Native land claims.' The request was based on the success Natives had
enjoyed seven years earlier in Tlingit and Haida Indiansv.United States." In
this case, the court held that the Tlingit and Haida Indians were entitled to
compensation for lands lost to the Metlakatla Indian Reservation, the
Tongass National Forest, and the Glacier Bay National Monument.' The
court's reasoning was two part. First, the court found ample evidence that
the Natives occupied the lands in question continuously up to the time of
withdrawal.' Second, the court held that the act dated June 19, 1935,"
which waived sovereign immunity and authorized the Tlingit and Haida
to bring their land claim suit before the court, had also recognized Indian
title." The court found that the Tlingit and Haida Indians had suffered
compensable losses.' In 1966 an independent review commissioned by the
court recommended that the compensation be $15.9 million, which was
substantially higher than the government's recommendation of $1.3
million.' The court granted compensation of about $7.5 million.'
Whether the Tlingit and Haida holding would withstand Supreme
Court review was questionable, since four years earlier the Court had ruled
in Tee-Hit-Ton that recognition of Indian title did not exist prior to Alaskan
Statehood.' Thus, the question was whether the Alaska Statehood Act
granted recognition of Indian title. In Organized Village of Kake v. Egan," the
Court decided that it did not. In this case, two Native villages sued Alaska

65. See Chieft Strss joint MusdeatConfrEc, ANCHORAGE DAILY TIM, Oct. 22,1966, at
1-2.
66. Tlingit & Haida Indians v. United States, 177 F.Supp. 452 (Ct. CL 1959).
67. See id. at 468. The Meflakatla reserve on Annette Island was created for a group of
Canadian Indians who migrated to Alaska under the leadership of white missionary William

Duncan. See ARNOLD, ET AL, supranote 2, at 80. They were granted 86,000 acres of land by
Congress in 1891. See id.
68.

See Tlingit & Haida, 177 F. Supp. at 457-60. See also CASE, supra note 17, at 67.

69. Act of June19,1935, ch. 275,49 Stat. 388.
70. See Tlingit & Haida, 177 F. Supp. at 454 (where the court states that the [Act of June
19, 1935, ch. 275, 49 Stat. 388] "provides that the loss to the claimant Indians of 'their right,
title, or interest...shall be held sufficient ground for relief hereunder"). The DOI maintained
that recognition had been granted by Congress in the Act. See Hearings1968, supra note 31, at
499 (letter from Stewart L. Udall, Secretary of the Interior, to Henry M. Jackson, Chair Senate

Interior Committee (April 30,1968)). See ARNOLD, supWra note 14, at 22-24 (critical of the DOI's
legal representation in the case).

71. See Tlingit & Haida,177 F. Supp. at 468.
72. See ARNOLD, supra note 14, at 22.
73.
74.
75.

See Tlingit & Haida Indians v. United States, 389 F.2d 778,789 (Ct. Cl.1968).
See Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272,290 (1955).
Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60,68-70 (1962).
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over regulations that restricted hunting, arguing that Section 4 of the
Statehood Ad 6 precluded the State from placing restrictions on aboriginal
fishing rights. The State, joined by the DOI, argued that the Statehood Act,
like the Organic Act, merely preserved the status quo." The Court ruled
against the Natives, stating: "[Congress's) concern was to preserve the
status quo with respect to aboriginal and possessory claims, so that
statehood would neither extinguish them nor recognize them as compensable." " Regarding the issue of whether Alaska's right to select lands was
impaired by the restrictions in Section 4 of the Statehood Act, the Court
stated: "It was understood that the disclaimer provision left the State free
to choose Indian 'property' if it desired, but that such a taking would leave
unimpaired the Indians' right to sue the United States for any compensation that might later be established to be due."'
The "status quo" was that Native land claims had neither been
recognized nor extinguished by the Statehood Act. Furthermore, the
"status quo" did not impair the State's right to select lands claimed by
Natives, nor did it reduce the federal liability for State land selections.' °
Thus, according to Kake Village, Native land claims were a moral, not a
legal, claim."1 The State criticized AFN's proposed resolution to place
Native land claims before the court of claims, arguing that this would
further frustrate State land selections while the litigation was pending.
Additionally, Alaska argued that the court of claims could only provide
monetary settlements, not land grants. As a solution, the State proposed
that Congress grant the Natives lands near their villages.

76. Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 4,72 Stat. 339,339 (1958).
77. See Kake Village, 369 US. at 65. See also Hearings1968, supranote 31, at 500 (letter from
Stewart L. Udall, Secretary of the Interior, to Henry M. Jackson, Chair Senate Interior
Committee (April 30,1968)).
78. Kake Village, 369 U.S. at 65 (emphasis added).
79. Id. at 65-66.
80. See CRAIG W. AWLN, THE POLITnSOP WIWDERNSPRSERVATION 32 (1982) (argues that
while Kake Village v.Egan was good law, it did not offer the Natives a means of resolving their
land claims).
81. This was the position taken by the State when Edgar Paul Boyko, Special Counsel to
the Govemor on Native Land Claims stated: "Without some legislation out of Congress, all
you [Natives] have is a moral title. You cannot take that to the bank." State Seeks Land Claims
United Front, ANCHORAGE DAILY TIMES, Feb. 27,1967, at 1. It was also the position taken by
John P. Saylor in his dissenting view of ANSCA. "[Tihe courts have universally held that the
justice or manner in which extinguishment of such a claim occurs cannot be the subject of
judicial inquiry, for it is a moral rather than a legal right and, as such, is a matter for political
rather than judicial consideration." H.R. RE. No. 92-523, at 53 (1971) reprinted in 1971
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2192, 2243.
82.

See Gov.Hickel Challengedto Land Claims Debate, ANCHORAGE DAILY TIMES, Feb. 8,

1967, at 1; Pollack Proposes Land Claim Panel,ANCHORAGE DAILY TIMES, Feb. 21,1967, at 2; State
Seeks Land Claims United Front, ANCHORAGE DAILY TIMEs, Feb. 27,1967, at 1.
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Despite Kake Village, between October 1966, when AFN was
formed, and January 1967, Native land claims were filed on an additional
100 million acres of land.' As a result, in late November 1966, the BLM
issued notice regarding scheduled oil lease sales: "Pending further
consideration of native claims, the monthly simultaneous oil and gas
leasing lists will contain only lands not under native protests."" Additionally, in late December 1966, Secretary Udall announced that he was
withholding leases that had already been sold on the North Slope pending
resolution of the Native land claims.s By this time it was clear that Udall
was putting a "freeze" on State land claims.*'
In February 1967, the state of Alaska, at the direction of its new
Republican Governor, Walter J. Hickel, filed suit in federal district court to
force Udall to patent State land selections near the village of Nenana. In
April 1967 the DOI filed a motion to dismiss the State's case, arguing that,
as sovereigns, the federal government and the Natives were immune from
suit.er
Early in 1967, Governor Hickel formed a Task Force on Native
Land Claims to tackle the problem of Native claims on the political front.
This task force produced proposed federal legislation in January 1968.
Additionally, both the DOI and the AFN proposed bills to Congress. In all,
six bills concerning Alaska Native land claims were introduced in the
83. The first was a claim by Bethel area natives to 76.8 million acres of land in the YukonKuskokwim delta. See Bethel Natives ClaimYukon-Kuskokwim Delta, ANCHORAGE DAILY TIMES,
Oct. 19,1966, at 1-2. It was followed by a claim by Copper River Natives to 16.6 million acres.
See Copper River IndiansFile Huge Land Claim, ANCHORAGE DAILY TIMES, Nov. 25,1966, at 1.
Then claims were made by Seward Peninsula area Natives to 10.9 million acres, by St.
Lawrence Island Natives for 1.4 million acres, and by Prince William Sound area Natives for
10.9 million acres. See Natives File Another Huge Claim Covering Seward Penninsula Land,
ANCHORAGE DAILY Tm, Dec. 14,1966, at 1; Natives Seek FederalAid in Oil Row, ANCHORAGE
DAILY TIMes, Dec. 24,1966, at 1-2; Native Group Enters Claim to Big Tract,ANCHORAGE DAILY
TIMEs, Jan. 6,1967, at 1.Additional land claims were made in February for the northern half
of the Kenai Peninsula, including lands on which oil drilling was already occurring and by
three south-central Alaskan groups for "nearly 50 million acres." See Natives Claim Huge
Region on Peninsula, ANCHORAGE DAILY TIMES, Feb. 7, 1967, at 1; Federal ProposalReady on
Native Claims,ANCHORAGE DAILY TIMES, Apr. 13,1967, at 1-2.
84. Quoted in Alaska Oil Report: Natives' Claims a Major Problem, ANCHORAGE DAILY TIMES,
Nov. 26,1966, at 6.
85. See Native Claims Cause Delay in Handout, ANCHORAGE DAILY TIMES, Dec. 20,1966, at
1-2.
86. Secretary Udall actually took no formal action to impose the freeze. Formal action
would come only in 1969 as he was leaving office (Richard M. Nixon having defeated Hubert
H. Humphrey in the 1968 presidential race) when he would issue Public Land Order 4582,
extending the freeze until the end of 1970. See Edwardsen v. Morton, 369 F.Supp. 1359,1364
n.11 (D.D.C. 1973).
87. See Alaska Land Suit Challenged: Government Files Move For Dismissal, ANCHORAGE
DAILY TIMES, Apr. 24,1967, at 1-2.
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Senate during the ninetieth Congress (1967-68) (See table 1). The first bill
proposed by the DOI (S. 1964) would have allowed the Natives to take
possession of 50,000 acres (in trust) per village and sue for compensation
based on the (fee simple) value of their lands in 1867 (the date of the Treaty
of Cession). The first AFN bill (S. 2690) simply proposed that Native land
claims be heard by the court of claims. The bill proposed by the State of
Alaska's Task Force on Native Land Claims (S. 2906) would have offered
the Natives 40 million acres of land. The DOI strongly objected to the task
force's bill, stating, "[Tihe grant of forty million acres to the Natives is
much greater than is required to give them title to the lands they need for
village expansion. The purpose of a land settlement of this magnitude is
clearly to allow the Natives to select land for investment purposes. " ' The
DOI also objected to Native land grants that overlapped with national
forests."' In an argument later adopted by a number of environmental
organizations, Secretary Udall stated, "The needs of Native groups
bounded by National forest lands can be met from the 400,000 acres of such
lands allowed the state under section 6(a) of the Alaska Statehood Act." '
In its second bill (S. 3586), introduced in April 1968, the DOI again urged
that a settlement consist of 50,000 acres per village, or approximately ten
million acres total (to be held in trust by the DOI) and a cash settlement of
$180 million, calculated at approximately $0.43 per acre (the proposed
settlement in Tlingit and Haida).91
Despite these efforts, two events prevented the ninetieth Congress
from settling the land claims issue: the discovery of oil on the North Slope
and the 1968 presidential elections. Throughout 1967 and the winter of
1967-68, oil companies drilled exploratory wells on the North Slope under
State oil leases.' In January 1968 Atlantic Richfield and Humble Oil
announced a gas discovery, described by one industry spokesman as "a
very rank wildcat."" In March 1968 Atlantic Richfield announced that it
had discovered a field at Prudhoe Bay estimated to hold 9.6 billion barrels
of oil. Although the Senate Interior Committee would hold hearings on the
land claims in February 1968 in Alaska, and in July 1968 in Washington,
D.C., no action was taken.

88. Hearings 1968, supra note 31, at 500 (letter from Stewart L. Udall, Secretary of the
Interior, to Henry M. Jackson, Chair Senate Interior Committee (April 30,1968)).
89.

However, National Forests are managed by the Department of Agriculture. See H.R.

REP. No. 92-523, at 50 (1971) reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2192,2240.
90. Hearings 1968, supra note 31, at 500 (letter from Stewart L. Udall, Secretary of the
Interior, to Henry M. Jackson, Chair, Senate Interior Committee (April 30,1968)).

91. See id. at,501.
92. See Arctic Slope Well Started, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEws, Apr. 25,1967, at I (the winter
of 1966-67 produced several dry holes).
93. BERRY, supranote 8, at 91.
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In November 1968 Republican Richard M. Nixon won the
presidential election. As a final act before leaving office, Secretary Udall
issued Public Land Order 4582 (PLO), which withdrew all public lands in
Alaska from selection eligibility until December 31, 1971." The DOI also
made two final withdrawals prior to Nixon's appointment, adding one
million acres to the Clarence Rhode National Wildlife Refuge and creating
a new 265,000-acre Cape Newenham National Wildlife Refuge." The State
also selected an additional 7.6 million acres of land under its right to select
federal mineral leases. This brought the total State selections in 1968 to 26
million acres, with 5.8 million acres patented and 7.9 million acres
tentatively patented.*
C. Oil, Environmentalists, and Congressional Action
1. The Trans-Alaska Pipeline
During the winter of 1968-69 Alaska attempted to build a road to
Prudhoe Bay. This was the first effort towards the development of the
North Slope oil fields. The "Hickel Highway" was an environmental
disaster.' Rather than piling snow on top of the tundra and sealing it with
water (which was the accepted method for winter road construction), the
Alaska Department of Transportation used bulldozers to dig down into the
tundra. The consequence was that when spring breakup came the Hickel
Highway became a river. Furthermore, it was a financial disaster as well,
costing the State the same amount had it used air-transport to move the
supplies instead.

94. Public Land Order 4582 states:
Subject to valid existing rights, and subject to the conditions hereinafter set
forth, all public lands in Alaska which are unreserved or which would
otherwise become unreserved prior to the expiration of this order, are
hereby withdrawn from all forms of appropriation and disposition under
the public land laws (except locations for metalliferous minerals) including
selection by the State of Alaska pursuant to the Alaska Statehood Act (72

Stat 339) and from leasing under the Mineral Leasing Act of February 25,
1920 (41 Stat 437; 30 U.S.C. 181, et seq) as amended, and reserve under the
jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior for the determination and

protection of the rights of the Native Aleuts, Eskimos, and Indians of Alaska.
The withdrawal and reservation created by this order shall expire at 12 p.m.
(midnight) A.S.T., December 31,1970.
S. REP. No. 91-925, at 79 (1970).
95. See S. REP. No. 92-405, at 98 (1971).
96. See id.
97. See BERRY, supna note 8, at 95-97.
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In November 1968, well before the spring breakup revealed the
damages of the Hickel Highway, President Nixon selected Governor Hickel
as Secretary of the Interior. When asked in December about Secretary
Udall's expected formal extension of the "land freeze," Governor Hickel
said, in reference to his expected confirmation, "Anything Udall can do by
Executive Order, I can undo."' As a consequence, during his confirmation
hearings, Governor Hickel had to promise he would not reverse Secretary
Udall's land freeze without permission from Congress as a condition of his
appointment."
In June 1969 the founders of the newly formed Trans-Alaska
Pipeline System (TAPS) applied to the DOI for permission to build an 800mile buried pipeline from Prudhoe Bay to the port at Valdez." As a
condition of his appointment, Secretary Hickel took the request to the
Senate Interior Committee, which granted TAPS permission to begin
engineering surveys.' However, at the same time, the Chief of the United
States Geological Survey released a report criticizing the plan to bury the
pipeline."° Nevertheless, in August, with the approval of the Senate
Interior Committee, Secretary Hickelauthorized the construction of a road
to be built along the proposed pipeline route from Livengood (70 miles
north of Fairbanks) to the Yukon River, some 50 miles away." Then, in
October 1969, after having obtained a waiver of the land claims from
Native groups to the right-of-way, Secretary Hickel sought permission
from the Senate and House Interior Committees to lift the freeze for the
entire pipeline. The Senate committee gave Hickel a set of questions that
needed to be answered regarding the impact of the project on the environment and on Alaska Natives. On December 11, 1969, after Secretary Hickel
assured Senate Interior Committee Chair Henry M. Jackson (D-WA) that
the DOI would not issue final building permits until environmental
problems with burying the pipeline in permafrost were resolved and the
Native interests satisfied, the Senate Interior Committee agreed to let
Hickel issue permits for construction. This consent was followed days later
by consent from the House." ' Thus, it appeared that the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline was about to be built.

98. Id.at 60.
99. See ARNOLD, Lrr
AL, supm note 2, at 125-26.
100. See BERRY, supra note 8, at 105. TAPS was a consortium of Atlantic Richfield, British
Petroleum, and Humble Oil. See id. at 102. In September 1969, Mobil, Phillips Petroleum,
Union Oil of California, Amerada-Hess, and Home Oil joined the consortium. See id. at 110.
101. See id. at 108.
102. See id. at 106-07.
103. See id. at 108.
104. See id. at 110-17.
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However, several events occurred that led to a delay in the
construction of the pipeline. In January 1970 some of the Native villages
that had earlier signed a waiver of their land claims on the right-of-way
sued TAPS for breach of contract, because no Native contractors had been
hired by TAPS. On March 9, 1970, Natives in five villages filed suit in
federal district court in an attempt to enjoin Secretary Hickel from issuing
further permits without providing work to Native contractors. The court
granted a temporary injunction for 19.8 miles of the pipeline corridor on
land claimed by Stephens Village, and urged the parties to reach an out-ofcourt settlement."0
To further complicate matters, on March 26, 1970, three environmental organizations, Friends of the Earth, the Wilderness Society, and the
Environmental Defense Fund, fied suit against the DOI for alleged violations of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)'0 when it
granted TAPS permits. On April 14,1970, the court issued an injunction on
the entire project until the case could be heard on its merits." TAPS was
now on hold, awaiting the resolution of numerous legal disputes.
2. Alaska v. Udall'"'
The state of Alaska won the first round in its suit against Secretary
of the Interior Udall for not patenting State land selections. On September
27, 1968, the district court entered a summary judgment in the State's
favor. 9 However, the DOI appealed, and in December 1969 the Ninth
Circuit reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case to be
heard on its merits. The Ninth Circuit stated:
No counter affidavit was filed based upon a physical examination of the lands in question. Even if countering affidavits
of this kind had been filed, however, the factual issue would
still remain, thereby rendering a summary judgment inappropriate. The only escape from this conclusion is to hold
that under no circumstances could Indian trapping, hunting,
and camping.. .constitute a condition which would deprive
the selected lands of the status of being "vacant, unapproprin
ated, and unreserved." We are unwilling to so hold. ,
The Ninth Circuit also granted the district court the discretion to
"hold the trial in abeyance for a reasonable period of time" given the

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

See id. at 117-18
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,42 U.S.C.
See BERRY, supra note 8, at 117-18.
Alaska v. Udall, 420 F.2d 938 (9th Cir. 1969).
See id. at 939.

110. Id. at940.

§§ 4321-4370 (1994).
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pending legislation in Congress.' Although the state elected to try the case
on its merits, no action was taken prior to the final passage of ANCSA.
3. The Ninety-FirstCongress
It was in this context that the ninety-first Congress took up the
issue of Native land claims." The Senate Interior Committee held hearings
in April and again in August 1969 on S. 1830 (see table 1)." S. 1830 was
drafted by the Federal Field Committee for Development Planning in
Alaska, which had been formed in 1968 at the request of Senate Interior
Committee Chair Jackson (D-WA)."4 S. 1830 provided $100 million in
compensation for lost lands and a conveyance of title to surface estate (i.e.,
no mineral rights) of one township per village (23,040 acres) or between
4.1-5.6 million acres total, depending upon how many villages qualified."
The DOI offered its own bill, in the nature of a substitute for S. 1830 (H.
13142 in the House and S. 1830 in the Senate). This bill provided a land
grant of two townships per village, including subsurface rights to locatable
minerals (not leaseable minerals) and compensation of $500 million. ' In
October 1969 the Alaska Federation of Natives submitted their own bill, S.
3041 (sponsored by United States Senator Mike Gravel [D-AK] and called
H. 14212 in the House) and as a substitute to S. 1830 (sponsored by United
States Senator Ted Stevens [R-AK]). 1 7 The Native bill quadrupled the land
grant to four townships (92,160 acres) per village for 242 villages and $500
million in compensation for lands lost. It also provided for land selections
in addition to village selections, for a total of 40 million acres."
In June 1970 the Senate Interior Committee reported on S. 1830
with a recommendation of ten million acres of land and a one billion dollar
111. /d.
112. We discuss congressional action at both the committee and chamber levels. See Barry
R. Weingast & William J.Marshall, The IndustrialOrganizationof Congress;or, Why Legislatures,
Like Firms, Are Not Organizedas Markets,96 J.POL EODN. 132 (1988) (discussing the importance
of committees in the legislative process).
113. See Alaska Native Land Claims:Hearingson S. 1830 Before the Senate Comm. On Interior
& InsularAffairs, 91st Cong. (1969) [hereinafter Senate Harings1969].
114. The Federal Field Committee also produced the report, Alaska Natives and the Land.
See generallyJOSEPH H. FrrzGERALD, Sr AL., ALASKA NATIVES AND THE LAND, FEDERAL FIELD
COM1ISSION ON LAND USE PLANNIN INALASKA (1968).
115. See Senate Hearings 1969, supra note 113, at 550. There were 209 villages listed in the
original bill. See S. REP. NO. 91-925, at 95 (1970).
116. See S. REP. No. 91-925, at 96-97 (1970).
117. Senator Gravel had been elected in 1968 after beating incumbent Senator Ernest
Gruening in the Democratic primary. Senator Stevens, who had also run for Senator
Gruening's seat but had lost in the Republican primary, was appointed by Governor Hickel
to replace Senator E.L Bartlett, who had died on December 11, 1968. See BERRY, supra note 8,
at 60, 77-78.
118. See Senate Hearings1969, supranote 113, at 550; S. REP. NO. 91-925, at 97-98 (1970).
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cash settlement to be paid out to Alaska Natives over 12 years." 9 The
Senate committee also authorized the Secretary of the Interior "at his
discretion, and after consulting with the State, to classify any lands
withdrawn by this section and to open to entry, selection.. .such lands as
he determines are chiefly valuable for the purposes provided for by such
laws." 2 The committee dearly intended this section to apply to the TAPS
corridor.' In addition, S. 1830 stated, "[n]othing in this section shall
restrict the land selection rights of the State under the Statehood Act.""
S. 1830 was taken up for consideration by the full Senate on July 14,
1970. The Senate voted on nine amendments to the bill. An important
amendment was offered by United States Senator Fred Harris (D-OK),
which would have increased the land grant from ten million to 40 million
acres. The Harris amendment was rejected 13-7l.' Another significant
amendment was sponsored by Senate Interior Committee Chairman
Jackson (D-WA), who wanted to ensure that competitive bidding was used
on all federal leasing tracts. This bidding scheme was widely believed to
benefit the major oil companies at the expense of smaller, independent oil
companies. Senator Jackson's amendment passed 47-35.' The Senate then
passed S. 1830 by a vote of 76-8.12 The bill was referred to the House,
where it died.
The House Interior Subcommittee on Indian Affairs held hearings
on H. 10193 (the House version of S.1830) and H. 13142 in Washington,
D.C., in August 1969. It continued its hearings in Alaska in October 1969
on H. 10193, H. 13142, and H. 14212.126 In the House, Interior Committee
Chair Wayne Aspinall (D-CO) referred the Native claims bills to the
Subcommittee on Indian Affairs, chaired by United States Congressman
James A. Haley (D-FL). Several environmental organizations testified. The
Sierra Club argued that the Native land grant should be to villages rather
than to individuals, and should be held in trust by the Secretary of the

119. See S. REP. No. 91-925, at 53-54,99 (1970).
120. Id. at 41 (1970) (S. 1830, § 23(a)(1) as reported by the Senate Interior & Insular Affairs
Committee).
121. See id. at 66 n.12.
122. Id. at 41 (S. 1830, § 23(a)(2) as reported by the Senate Interior & Insular Affairs
Committee).
123. See Alaska Land Claims, XXVI CONG. Q. ALMANAc 767,769 (1970). The vote occurred
on July 15, 1970. See id. at 768.
124. See id. at 769.
125. See id. at 768.
126. See Alaska Native Land Claims: Ieringson H.R. 13142 &H.R. 10193 Befor the Submm.
on Indian Affairs of the House Comm. on Interior& InsularAffairs, 91st Cong. (1969) [hereinafter
House Hearings1969h; Alaska Native Land Claims:Hearingson H.R. 10193, H.R. 13142 & H.R.
14212 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Afirs of the House Comm.on Interior& InsularAffairs, 91st
Cong. (1969).
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Interior to prevent the lands from being sold to non-Natives." The
National Wildlife Federation argued that the Native land grant should not
exceed 50,000 acres per village or 2.5 million acres total, and they advocated
granting only subsistence rights (i.e., not commercial rights) for hunting,
fishing, and trapping.'
In retrospect, the most significant House hearings were the ones
held in Alaska in October 1969. When the plans were being made for these
hearings, Congressman Aspinall told the Alaskans that it was a working
tour and not to bother with entertainment. In addition, the hearings were
scheduled shortly after the State held its famous oil lease sale (in which it
had earned $900 million in bonus bids) and followed a highly publicized
tour of Alaska by the Senate Indian Education subcommittee, chaired by
Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA).Y As a consequence, Congressman Haley's

committee hearings received relatively little publicity, which greatly upset
the congressman. When the Senate passed S. 1830 and attention turned to
the House, Congressman Haley refused to either meet with lobbyists or to
schedule votes on the bills before his committee, stating, "the lobbyists will
write this bill over my dead body."'
4. The Department Of Interior'sPost-Hickel Position
In November 1970 President Nixon fired Secretary Hickel for
criticizing the administration's policy in Vietnam.1 3' Hickel's replacement
was Congressman Rogers C.B. Morton (R-MD). In his confirmation
hearings, Morton criticized the Draft Environmental Impact Statement
released by the DOI under Secretary Hickel for the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline.'
At the beginning of the ninety-second Congress in February 1971,
S. 35 was introduced in the Senate with language identical to bill S.1830
passed by the Senate in 1970. In the House, Congressman Aspinall
announced that the Interior Committee was considering a bill (H. 3100) that
would grant the Natives their village land and lands three times their
127. "By making the grants to groups rather than individuals and by making them
inalienable, we will guard against having small parcels drift out of native ownership over a
period of time, with the best sites inevitably finding their way into the hands of non-natives."
House Hearings 1969, supra note 126, at 289 (statement of Lloyd Tupling, Washington
Representative of the Sierra Club).
128. See id, at 295 (Resolution of the National Wildlife Federation,33rd Annual Convention,
Washington, D.C., Feb. 28-Mar. 2,1969).
129. This committee was not involved in writing the Native land claims legislation. See
BERRY, supranote 8, at 84.
130. Id. at 83-84.
131.

Secretary Hickel's firing also took place with only a month to go before he could lift

the land freeze. See ARNOLD, ET AL, supra note 2, at 126.
132. See BERRY, supranote 8, at 217.
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village size (1-3 million acres total) plus 40 million acres for subsistence

purposes.
In February 1971 the Senate Interior Committee invited the newly
appointed Secretary Morton to speak to them about the DOI's intentions
for an Alaska bill. The Natives were shocked when Secretary Morton
stated:
After reviewing the administration's proposal submitted to
the last Congress, I believe that it represents a just settlement
of the Native claims issue. I feel, however, that the land
portion of the administration's proposal should be amended
to provide that each Native village would get fee simple title
to the public lands which it occupies plus fee simple title to
additional public lands adjacent to the villa e site of not more
than three times the acreage of the village site.
On February 21, 1971, AFN president Don Wright wrote to
Secretary Morton stating, "I and my fellow Alaskan Natives were frankly
shocked at your testimony last week before the Senate Interior Committee
on the Native Land Claims Bill. In our opinion the legislation which you
indicated you will submit is a serious retreat from last year's Administration position."' In addition to his remarks about the DOI position on the
Native land claims, Secretary Morton indicated that the Administration's
position with respect to the Alaskan pipeline had changed: "It would seem
to me that to withdraw [the pipeline] corridor from a joint management
concept, or a land-use planning concept, that should be developed for the
whole State of Alaska, would be a very dangerous thing. " 'lsSecretary
Morton also indicated that the DOI had identified "some areas" to be
withdrawn for inclusion as national parks or wilderness areas.L
Thus, in his first meeting with Congress as Secretary of the Interior,
Morton indicated that he believed the Natives should get a much smaller
land settlement than either of the two bills being considered, and that any
additional land withdrawals (including TAPS or Native claims) could occur
only after the DOI completed its land-use planning for the whole State.
These significant changes in DOI policy proved to be harbingers of what
was to come. However, the DOI bill presented in April (S. 1571) did not

133. Alaska Native Land Claims:Hearingson S.35 &S.835 Befire the Senate Comm. on Interior
& InsularAffairs, 92nd Cong. 272 (1971) (emphasis added).
134. Id. at 311 (letter from Don Wright, President Alaska Federation of Natives, to Rogers
C.B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior (Feb. 24,1971)).
135. Id.at 273.
136. Assistant Secretary to the Interior Loesch stated that "talks are going on right now
between [the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation and the National Park Service] and some of the
interested conservation organizations" regarding withdrawals of this kind. Id.at 282-83.
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reflect Secretary Morton's radical suggestions. 13 S. 1571 granted 40 million
acres to the Natives, withdrawing 25 townships around each village within
which their selections could be made for a period of five years. Additionally, it excluded from Native land selections the pipeline corridor and state
lands that were either patented or tentatively approved. Under this bill, the
state was also allowed to continue its land selections, with the exception of
the 25 township withdrawals, which amounted to about 100 million acres
of land.' However, the pipeline itself was not yet approved, and the DOI
had not yet released its NEPA report.1 In addition to S. 35 (S. 1830 from
the ninety-first Congress) and S. 1571, the Senate Interior Committee also
had under consideration S. 835, drafted by the Alaska Federation of
Natives and introduced by Senator Harris. S. 835, if passed, would have
granted the Natives 60 million acres of land.
In the House, three bills were under consideration by the House
Interior Subcommittee on Indian Affairs: H. 3100, which was the initial bill
proposed by Congressmen Haley and Aspinall; H. 7432, the DOI's bill
(identical to S. 1571); and H. 10367, also introduced by Congressman
Aspinall (see table 1).4 The Haley-Aspinall bill, H. 3100, granted the
Natives only 1-3 million acres of land near their villages. Both Haley and
Aspinall (the latter who was not a voting member of the subcommittee)
opposed an amendment to H. 3100 that would create an Alaska Native
Commission charged with administering the bill. However, on July 7,1971,
this amendment was struck in a 9-8 subcommittee vote. Congressman
Haley, as chair of the subcommittee, then adjourned the meeting and did
not schedule another. This could have effectively stopped the legislation.
However, at the request of both AFN and the oil companies, freshman
congressman Nick Begich (D-AK) agreed to sponsor a version of H. 10367
that responded to the requirements of Congressman Aspinall." H. 10367,
as reported from subcommittee on August 3,1971, contained no provisions
for land-use planning, no pipeline withdrawals, and placed the non-village

137. See BERRY, supra note 8, at 142-62 (credits Alaska Federation of Natives (AFN)
pressure on President Nixon and Vice-President Spiro T. Agnew for the change in
Administration policy).
138. See Alaska Native Land Claims:Hearingson S. 35, S. 835 & S.1571 Before the Senate Comm.
on Interior& InsularAffairs, 92nd Cong. 461 (1971).

139. See id. at 453-56,463-66.
140. There were seven bills referred to the House Interior Committee, only the ones
mentioned received any briefings by the DOI or the major interest groups. See H.R. REP. No.
92-523, at 2-3 (1971) reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2192, 2193 (for a list of the other bills).
141. TAPS (which was now called Alyeska) lobbyist William C. Foster convinced APN to

negotiate with Aspinall: "You can't ride over AspinalU four times in a row-in subcommittee,
in committee, on the floor, and in conference," Foster told AFN president Don Wright, "So
go with him, not against him." BERRY, supra note 8, at 178.
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selections (22
million acres of the 40 million total) after state land
2
selections.1
H. 10367 was reported by voice vote of the House Interior
Committee on September 28,1971.' It offered 40 million acres of land and
a cash settlement of $925 million, of which $500 million would come from
the State.'" The committee rejected an amendment to H. 10367 proposed
by Congressmen Udall and Saylor that would have withdrawn all public
lands in Alaska from State selections and the Trans-Alaska Pipeline until
a federal land-use plan was made.' The committee report noted that no
hearings had been held on the land-use planning issue, and that the
committee had ruled this amendment was not germane. However, the
committee did empower the Secretary of the Interior to prevent private
withdrawals under mining and mineral leasing laws, through an amendment to H. 10367 (in the form of a substitute) by Congressman John Kyl (RIA).'" The Kyl substitute did not apply to either Native or State land
selections.' The committee rejected an amendment to H. 10367 to limit the
total monetary settlement to $500 million.' Congressman Saylor, ranking
Republican on the House Interior Committee, wrote a dissenting view to
accompany the Committee Report in which he argued:
Lifting the "land freeze" without proper provisions for
planned and controlled disposition of the public lands will
throw our Nation's last great unit of public domain open to
immediate and devastating disposal under archaic public
land laws left over from an era when the national goal was to
dispose of the public domain on a wholesale or piecemeal
basis.. .To state that comprehensive land use planning for
Alaska should await the passage of other bills before the
Congress is to close the gate after the horses are gone.""
On September 30,1971, two days after H. 10367 was reported out
of the House Interior Committee, eleven environmental groups plus the
National Rifle Association sent a letter to President Nixon stating that the
House Interior Committee had responded to "speculators and exploiters"
who lobbied, and that this had resulted in "enormous grants of public land

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

See id.
at 178-81.
See H.R. REP. No. 92-523, at 10-11 (1971) reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2192,2200.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See BERRY, supranote 8,at 185.
See H.R. REP. No. 92-523, at 55 (1971) reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.AN. 2192,2245.

149. Id.at 55-56,2245-46.
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and some money for natives, but no restraints upon the commercial
exploitation of the public lands of Alaska."" s
The Senate Interior Committee unanimously reported S. 35 on
October 21, 1971.1 The land grant portion of the bill contained two options
for the Natives. Option A granted the Natives 40 million acres, but
restricted the grant to lands adjacent to their villages. Option B granted the
Natives 20 million acres near their villages plus ten million acres to be
selected anywhere in the State (before State selections) for economic
development.l S. 35 proposed a monetary settlement of $1 billion."ra The
bill, as reported, also allowed the Secretary of the Interior to withdraw both
the pipeline corridor, Section 24(b)(3), and lands for possible inclusion into
the National Park or Wildlife Refuge systems, Section 24(c)(4). As the
Committee report explained it, "In Alaska there still remains an opportunity to set aside a portion of the public lands at no cost for the enjoyment of
present and future generations."" u
5. Final Passageof the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
The Interior Committees of the House and Senate were thus
sending similar bills to their respective floors. In both houses, the Native
land grant was up to 40 million acres, and the monetary settlement was on
the order of $1 billion. In the House, the Interior Committee explicitly
rejected the Udall-Saylor amendment to withdraw all federal lands prior
to State and Native withdrawals. In the Senate, the withdrawal of
conservation lands was included. Thus, the two houses were close to
agreement on the monetary and land settlement, but were far from
agreement on the environmental withdrawals.
House debate on H. 10367 began on October 19, 1971. The first
question was whether an amendment proposed by Congressmen Udall and
Saylor was germane. The amendment directed the Secretary of the Interior
to withdraw 126 million acres of land, 76 million acres of which were
specified, and 50 million acres of which were left to the discretion of the
Secretary of the Interior. The withdrawals would have priority over all but
Native village land selections (i.e., over State land selections and Native
land selections on 22 million acres). The Udall-Saylor amendment was

150. Alaska Claims: Natives to Receive $962 Million, XXVII CONG. Q. ALMANAC 828, 830
(1971). The 11 environmental organizations included Alaska Action Committee, Citizens
Committee on Natural Resources, Defenders of Wildlife, Environmental Action, Friends of
the Earth, National Wildlife Federation, Sierra Club, Trout Unlimited, Wilderness Society,
Wildlife Management Institute, and Zero Population Growth. Id.

151. See id. at 832.
152. See BERRY, supra note 8, at 182-84.
153. See S. REP. No. 92-405, at 64 (1971).
154. Id. at 170-71 (emphasis added).
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opposed by both AFN and the National Council of American Indians.'
Congressman Aspinall argued that the bill was not germane, but Congressman William C. Natcher (D-KY), who was chair of the House debate,
overruled Aspinall.1" United States Congressman Elford Cederberg (R-MI)
offered an amendment to the Udall-Saylor amendment that would clearly
specify that the bill did not affect the proposed Trans-Alaska Pipeline.
Cederberg's amendment to the Udall-Saylor amendment was adopted by
voice vote. However, the House rejected the Udall-Saylor amendment,
177-217.'7 Also rejected by voice vote was an amendment offered by
United States Congressman Joseph P. Vigorito (D-PA) which would have
reduced the Native land settlement from 40 million acres to ten million
acres.1" The House passed H. 10367 on October 20, 1971, by a vote of
334r-63159

The Senate took up consideration of H. 10367 on November 1,1971.
The Senate first substituted S. 35 for H. 10367 by voice vote. Only three
amendments were considered, and all were voted on by voice. The most
significant amendment was offered by Senator Alan Bible (D-NV). This
amendment effectively prioritized federal withdrawals for parks and
wildlife refuges over State land selections. The Senate adopted the Bible
amendment. The Senate then voted to adopt H. 10367 by a 76-5 vote. All
five dissenters were fiscally conservative Republicans."W
Thus, the House version of H. 10367 granted the Natives 40 million
acres of land. Specifically, 18 million acres would be selected near villages,
and the remaining 22 million acres would be selected following State
selection of 80 million acres. In addition, the House version of this bill did
not have any federal withdrawals other than those already in existence,
and it contained no provision for withdrawal of a pipeline corridor.
In contrast, the Senate version granted either 40 million acres,
confined to lands adjacent the villages, or 20 million acres near the villages
plus ten million acres elsewhere, with all selections having priority over the
State's selections. The Senate version also allowed the federal government

155. See Alaska Claims: Natives to Receive $962 Million, XXVII CONG. Q. ALMANAC 828,830
(1971).
156. See BERRY, supranote 8, at 192.
157. See Alaska Claims: Natives to Rewive $962 Million, XXVII CONG. Q. ALMANAC 828, 83031 (1971). The vote by party was Republicans 88-76 and Democrats 89-141. See id.
158. See id. at 831.
159. See CQ House Votes, XXVII CONG. Q. ALMANAC 72-H (1971). The vote by party was
Republicans 121-46, Democrats 213-17. See Id.
160. See Alaska Claims:Natives to Receiv $962 Million, XXVII CONG. Q. ALMANAC 828,832-

33(1971).
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to withdraw all lands from State selection for five years and withdraw a
pipeline corridor from both State and Native land selections.161
The conference committee included, among others, Senators
Jackson, Gravel, Stevens, and Bible, and Congressmen Aspinall, Haley,
Saylor, Udall, Kyl, Meeds (D-WA) and Begich. Senator Bible and Congressmen Saylor and Udall represented the environmentalists, while Alaskan
Senators Gravel and Stevens and Alaskan Congressman Begich represented the State's interests." 2 The three Alaskans and Congressman Kyl
represented the development interests, and Congressman Meeds represented the Native interests." The AFN told the State that if it did not get
to select 40 million acres before the State, it would fight State selections in
court and fight any extension of the deadline for State land selections.1 " On
the Native land selections issue, the Conference Committee allowed the
Natives to select 40 million acres total, but restricted the selections to the 25
townships surrounding each village. On the environmental lands issue, the
Conference Committee allowed the Secretary of Interior to withdraw from
the State selections up to 80 million acres, including the 76 million acres
that had already been classified as being potential lands to withdraw for
parks or wildlife refuges.'" The Conference Committee also adopted a
provision that allowed the Secretary of Interior to withdraw lands for the
pipeline corridor, prior to Native and State land selections. The Conference
Committee report was issued on December 14,1971.'"
The Senate adopted the conference report on December 14, 1971,
by voice vote. No dissent was voiced on the floor, although Senator Jackson
read into the Congressional Record a statement listing his reservations to
the bill, including his objection to the absence of a competitive bidding
requirement. Congressmen Saylor and Cederberg voiced opposition in the
House. Both complained that the settlement was too generous, with
Congressman Saylor arguing that "[o]il has talked to the White House and
oil has talked to the Indians and oil has talked to the people of the United
States. The price has gone up and up and up."" The final House vote was

161. See id. at 834.
162. Senators Lee Metcalf (D-MT), Frank Church (D-ID), and Gordon Allot (R-CO) and
Congressmen Ed Edmonson (D-OK), Sam Steiger (R-AZ), and John N. Camp (R-OK) were
also on the committee. See BERRY, supra note 8, at 200.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 202.
165. See Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L No. 92-203, § 17(d)(2)(A) 85 Stat.
688,709-10 (1971) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1610 (1994)).

166. See S. REP. No. 92-581 (1971). See also Alaska Claims: Natives to Receive $962 Million,
XXVII CONG. Q. ALMANAC 828,834 (1971).

167. Alaska Claims: Natives to Receive $962 Million, XXVII CONG. Q. ALMANAC 828, 834

(1971).
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307-60. President Nixon signed the bill into law on December 18, 1971.
Thus, the Native land claims were settled, but the issue of federal
conservation withdrawals was pushed to the forefront, and the issue of
whether a pipeline would ever be built in the corridor withdrawn by the
DOI was left undecided.
IIl. ANALYSIS OF THE HOUSE VOTES
Let us now turn to an analysis of congressional voting on the
different versions of ANCSA considered by Congress. We are interested in
determining the degree to which the oil industry, environmentalists, and
Natives affected congressional votes. Specifically, our analysis focuses on
three House votes from 1971. We focus on House votes because we are
particularly interested in the environmentalists' effect on the federal
withdrawals contained in Section 17(d)(2) of ANSCA (the so-called "d-2"
lands) and only the House voted on this issue. The three House votes we
examine are (1) the final vote on H. 10367 (HOUSE) passed by the House
334-63, (2) the vote on the Udall-Saylor amendment (UDALL) rejected by
the House 177-217 and, (3) the vote on the Conference Committee version
of H. 10357 (CONFERENCE) passed by the House 307-60.
A. Statistical Analysis of Congressional Voting on ANSCA
The econometric model we utilize in an attempt to discern the
effect of various constituencies on legislative votes is based on a "principalagent" view of a legislature."ss The principal-agent view is founded, in part,
on the presumption that congressmen act as agents for their constituencies.
Thus, by extension, this model assumes that pressures from a congressman's constituency will affect his or her voting behavior. For example,
congressmen with large pro-environment constituencies are expected to be
more likely to support the UDALL amendment.

168. The standard econometric analysis of congressional voting attempts to explain the
vote a particular congressman makes as a function of constituency and ideological
preferences. See, e.g., James B. Kau & Paul H. Rubin, Self-Interest, Ideology, and Logrolling In
CongressionalVoting, 22 J.L &ECON. 365 (1979); Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among
PressureGroupsfor PoliticalInfluence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983); Arthur T. Denzau & Michael C.
Munger, Legislatorsand Interest Groups: How UnorganizedInterests Get Represented, 80 AM. POL
Sc. Ruv. 89 (1986); Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic
Theory of Politics, 74 AM. EcoN. REV. 279 (1984) [hereinafter Kalt & Zupan-Captureb Joseph
P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, The Apparent IdeologicalBehavior of Legislators:Testingfor Principal
Agent Slack in Political Institutions, 33 J.L. & ECON. 103 (1990) jhereinafter Kalt & ZupanBehavior]; Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 16 J.L. & ECON. 211
(1976); Sam Peltzman, ConstituentInterestand CongressionalVoting, 27 J.L. & EcON. 181 (1984);
George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J.ECON. 3 (1971).
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However, it is well known that constituency pressures do not
entirely dictate how a congressman votes. In particular, since voters, in
their individual capacity, have a small chance of affecting the outcome of
whether or not a congressman will be re-elected; many voters rationally
remain uninformed of a candidate's position on issues. This fact allows
members of Congress to vote against their constituents' interests (or
"shirk") at least some of the time. Thus, in addition to constituency
variables, it is necessary to utilize variables that represent other forces that
influence the voting behavior of individual congressmen69 We call these
"shirking variables." Since shirking implies that a congressman will vote
against the wishes of his constituency, we shall measure shirking as the
portion of time a congressman votes on particular issues that is unexplained by variables that are representative of his constituents' interests.
This variable is often referred to as a measure of the "unexplained
ideology" of the congressman.
The basic econometric model is of the following form:

(1)Vi = a+pC,+rR+ 6Bj +8e,
V, represents how an individual congressman i votes on vote j (i.e., j
HOUSE, UDALL, or CONFERENCE). Vq = 1 if the congressman votes
"yes," and V9 = 0 if the congressman votes "no". C,is a vector of variables
describing congressman i's constituency. Ri is a vector of idiosyncratic
characteristics of the congressman (the "shirking variable" discussed

above). B,is a vector of characteristics of the bill being voted on. Unex-

plained residual error is represented by q. Finally, a, /3,r, and 6 are vectors
of parameters to be estimated.
The null hypothesis with respect to the interest groups is that P/=
0 for each group. If this hypothesis is accepted, then it is presumed that the
interest group did not affect the way congressmen voted. Rejection of this
hypothesis implies the interest group did affect the way a congressman
voted. The null hypothesis with respect to "shirking" is that r = 0, or that
a congressman's idiosyncratic characteristics do not help to explain his
vote. Rejection of this hypothesis implies that effects other than direct
constituency pressures affect the way a congressman votes. The final
hypothesis of interest is whether the characteristics of the bill affect how
each congressman votes. The null hypothesis is that the characteristics of
the votes do not matter (i.e., 6 =0) after controlled for constituency and

169. See Kalt & Zupan-Capture, supranote 168; Kalt & Zupan-Behavior, supra note 168
(developing this methodology).
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congressional shirking effects. Rejection of this null hypothesis implies that
Congress has preferences for the characteristics of the bills. 170
The bill characteristic variables, B,, include the monetary settlement
to the Natives and the amount of environmental land withdrawn by the
Secretary of Interior for inclusion in parks, wildlife refuges, and wilderness
areas. While the land settlement to Natives remained constant at 40 million
acres," the monetary settlement varied: $925 million in HOUSE and
UDALL, and $962.5 million in CONFERENCE. The environmental land
withdrawals are zero in HOUSE, 80 million acres in CONFERENCE, and
125 million acres in UDALL. There was one other difference between the
bills. The HOUSE bill did not specifically withdraw the pipeline corridor,
as was done in the CONFERENCE bill. The UDALL amendment did not
do this either, but the House adopted by voice vote the Cederberg
amendment, which stated that nothing in the UDALL amendment affected
the pipeline.72 While there are other differences between the bills, these are
the most important for the Natives, environmentalists, and oil companies.
As the B. are a constant for each bill (i.e., the characteristics of a particular
bill are te same to each congressman), we combined the three bills in the
regression analysis of (1).1n
The constituency variables, C, account for demographic differences
and population density. Demographic variables, such as median income
170. We are only able to measure a linear approximation of these preferences since there
were two dimensions on which the votes differed (the Native monetary settlement and the
environmental land withdrawal) and three different votes.
171. However, the CONFERENCE bill did not allow Natives to select land outside the
twenty-five township area surrounding each village (unless the village was in a park or
wildlife refuge) while the HOUSE and UDALL bills did. See Alaska Claims: Natives to Receive
$962 Million, XXVII CONG. Q. ALMANAc 828,834 (1971).
172. From an econometric standpoint, it is not possible to identify the effects of each of
these three differences given that there are only three votes. However, we believe that the
differences between the pipeline withdrawal can be ignored. First, the House had adopted
Congressman Cedezberg's pipeline withdrawal amendment in the UDALL amendment. Thus,
the House was willing to adopt this part of the bill. Second, the House members were aware
that the Senate version did include this provision and that because of the other differences
(the environmental land withdrawals and the monetary settlement) the pipeline withdrawal
would reasonably be included in the conference bill, as in fact did occur. Third, whether the
pipeline was or was not withdrawn was in many respects academic. The environmentalist's
suit regarding the NEPA requirements meant that the pipeline issue would have to be
revisited by Congress anyway, and this is exactly what happened.
173. If B, is the total monetary grant to Natives, then B, is the same number for each
congressman on a particular vote. This means that one cannot distinguish the effects of the
monetary settlement from the average propensity to support the bill. Formally, when a single
vote is examined, B,is an exact linear combination of another variable (the column of ones
used to identify the intercept). Thus, the effects of the intercept and 81cannot be identified.
However, this problem is overcome if the three votes are combined, since the intercept value
remains constant across the votes, but the B, variable does not.
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and education are included because higher education and income may
result in a greater preference for the environment17' Population density per
square mile is included to capture differences between the West and the
more densely populated parts of the country. The percentage change in
population between 1960 and 1970 is included because higher growth
regions may prefer economic growth. The percent living in urban and
suburban areas and living in central cities is included because urban areas
may be more sympathetic to environmental issues." To measure how
conservative a congressman's district is, we included the percentage of
votes cast in his district for Nixon in the 1968 presidential elections. We
included the percent of the workforce that is unionized because unions,
such as AFL-CIO, announced support for both the Native Claims Settlement Act and for the Trans-Alaska Pipeline. 78 We also include three
additional variables to describe the size of the three interest groups: the
percent of the population in the United States that is Native American, the
amount of petroleum and gas production in each state, and the number per
1,000 adults that belong to six major environmental organizations.'
The shirking variables (R) that describe a congressman's own
preferences encompass several elements. First, his party affiliation (coded
as equal to one for Republicans and zero for Democrats) is included
because different parties may, and often do, cater to different constituencies. Second, the number of years a member of Congress has been in office
is also included because members with more seniority have better name
recognition in elections, and are often better able to shirk with respect to
their constituent's preferences. Third, the congressman's margin of victory
(measured as difference between the percentage of votes received by the
congressman in his 1970 race and his closest rival) is included because
members with more secure seats can afford to shirk more. 7 Fourth, three

174. Seegeneral/y Matthew E Kahn & John G. Matsusaka, Demondfor Environmental Goods:
Evidencefrom Voting Patternson Cal forna Initiatives,40 J.L & ECON. 137 (1997) (observing this
effect).
175. See id. at 148.
176. See BERRY, supra note 8, at 169; COATS, supra note 63, at 247.

177. This data was kindly provided by Mark Zupan.
178. See GARYC. JACOaON, Th PoLrtICS OF CoN sNAL ELECIONS 37-47 (3d ed. 1987)
(suggesting that incumbency is important for re-election). A greater election margin gives
more freedom to the representative to pursue his own interests. In addition, seniority,
measured by years in office, increases the value of a congressman's "brand-name," and
decreases the necessity of advertising in campaigns. As Jacobson puts it, "Familiarity by no
means breeds only favorable responses. More important, the benefits of incumbency
obviously extend far beyond greater familiarity. Incumbents are better liked-by a wide
margin-as well as being better known than challengers. At any level of familiarity, voters
are more inclined to mention something they like about the incumbent than about the
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voting index ratings, the League of Conservation Voters (LCV), the
Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), and the National Taxpayer's
Union (NTU), are included. 1 " The LCV index is included to capture how
well the congressional votes conform to the desires of environmental
organizations. The ADA index is included to capture general liberalconservative differences among congressmen. The NTU index is included
because each of the bills caused the federal government to increase its
expenditures by a half billion dollars, and many objections to ANCSA were
due to its cost. Fifth, as a measure of support for the oil company interests,
the TAPS-NEPA is included because the ANSCA would not have passed
had it not been for the efforts of oil interests.'r We would have preferred
to have a voting index score for oil interests, but one did not exist at the
time.

There were no other bills during the ninety-second Congress that
appeared to directly affect the oil industry. However, in 1973 Congress
considered authorizing the Trans-Alaska Pipeline. The closest and most
important House vote in that debate was over whether the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline was to be subject to NEPA. The TAPS-NEPA amendment, offered
by Congressman Douglas W. Owens (D-UT), would have deleted the
language that required construction of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline to comply
with NEPA's environmental impact statement requirements. If adopted,
this would have effectively delayed construction of the pipeline indefinitely. The Owens amendment was defeated 198-221. Thus, a vote against
the amendment was a vote in favor of the oil companies. Below, we code
a "no" vote as a one and a "yes" vote as a zero, so that this index is
consistent with the other indices (an increase in the index is an increase in
the support for the oil companies' position).
Following Kau and Rubin and Kalt and Zupan m the "unexplained
ideology" variables are created using the voting index variables LCV,
ADA, NTU, and TAPS-NEPA. The "explained" part of the voting index is
that part of the voting index scores that can be explained using an ordinary

challenger, negative responses are rather evenly divided, so the net benefit is clearly to the
incumbent." Id.at 121.
179. We use the 1970 LCV and ADA scores and 1973 NTU score since those are the first
years each was available. The use of lagged or future indexes avoids the problem of
simultaneity between the index and the votes. This problem was especially present for LCV
as the 1972 index is based on, among others, the Udall-Saylor amendment. The NTU index
has a problem in that it was not available for the 92nd Congress. Thus, congressmen who did
not get re-elected in 1972 do not have an NTU index. We gave each congressmen in this
situation an NTU index of zero and included a dummy variable for each congressman not
having an NTU index to control for this effect.
180. See BERRY, supra note 8, at 194.
181. See Kau &Rubin, supra note 168, at 365; Kalt &Zupan, supra note 168, at 279.
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least squares estimation (probit in the case of TAPS-NEPA) regressing the
index value 1# on constituency variables and non-voting index
congressman-specific variables."8 The unexplained ideology is measured
as the difference between the predicted index and the actual index, Le., the
regression residual. In particular, the voting index equations are estimated
by the following:
(2) 1#=,v. + xC, +rA +j,
I0is the voting index for congressman i and the voting indexj = LCV, NTU,
ADA, and TAPS-NEPA. C, is the set of constituency variables described
above. R is the set of variables in RP describing the congressmen's party,
seniority, and margin in the 1970 election. Unobservable econometric
residual error is represented by §, and;rk the parameters to be estimated.
In the case of the TAPS-NEPA regression, the index I#is either a
zero or a one, so the model is estimated using a probit maximum likelihood
estimation procedure." For the other indices, the index value may be
anywhere between zero and a hundred, and the equation is estimated by
ordinary least squares. The unexplained ideology variables are thus equal
to 4 = I#- I,where I#is the predicted value of the voting index based on
the variables included in equation (2). Thus, when the estimated voting
index residual . is greater than zero, the congressman is more supportive
of the interest group than his constituency variables predict, and when
is less than zero, the congressman is less supportive of the interest group
than his constituency variables predict.
The null hypotheses in (2) are that the r, ,r, and J2 parameters are
not statistically different from zero. Rejection of the null hypothesis implies
that the variable affects the congressman's voting index score. In these
regressions, the adjusted R2 statistic provides a measure of the proportion
of the voting index score that is attributable to the congressman's constituency and observable characteristics.
The regression model (1) assumes that the constituency and
shirking variables had an identical effect on the way the congressman

182. See Kalt & Zupan-Behavior, supra note 168, at 110-11 (who refer to the "explained"
part of a rating
as the "fitted part reflecting underlying constituents' interests" and the
"unexplained " part as '[congressman]-specific residual"). See generally Bruce Bender &John
R. Lott, Jr., Legislator Voting and Shirking: A CriticalReview of the Literature,87 PUB. CHOICE 67
(1996); Peter M.Vandoren, Can We Ln Causes of CongressionalDecisionsfrom Roll.Call Data?,
15 LsExs. STuD. Q. 311 (1990) (for discussions of problems in measuring the ideology of

legislators).
183. The TAPS-NEPA residual using a regression model of the form of (1). As with the
NTU index, not all Congressmen were in the 93rd Congress to vote on the Owens
amendment. We use the same procedure as with the NTU index to deal with this problem.
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voted on each of the three votes we consider. We created a second model
to test whether the constituency and shirking variables accept this
additional hypothesis. We accomplished this by utilizing the following
model, again simultaneously using each of the three votes:
(3) VJ= a + PcCi + pfc,I+p

+ rujUi+ rR'I.+ 6j +e,
l rcR
+

U, is a dummy variable equal to one if the vote is on the UDALL amendment and zero otherwise. H. is a dummy variable equal to one if the vote
is on the HOUSE bill and zero otherwise. In this model, the slope coefficient for the constituency effects on the UDALL vote are equal to Pc + Pu,
the constituency slope coefficient for the CONFERENCE vote is Pc , and the
constituency slope coefficient for the HOUSE vote is Pc + PH. The shirking
parameters are similar. Thus, the parameters P. and PH (or ru and rH)
measure the difference in the constituency (shirking) slope coefficients
between the CONFERENCE and the UDALL and HOUSE votes, respectively. We are thus able to test the hypotheses that slope coefficients are
equal to zero for a particular vote, Le., whether Pc = 0, Pc + PH = 0, Pc + Pu
= 0, rc = 0, rc + rH = 0, or rc+'u = 0. These tests tell us whether or not the
variable in question affected the way that congressmen voted on the
particular bill.
Acceptance of the null hypothesis implies the variable does not
affect the way the congressman votes on the particular bill, while rejection
of the null hypothesis implies that the variable does affect the way the
congressman votes on the particular bill. Alternatively, we can also test the
hypotheses that Pu = 0, PH = 0, ru = 0, or rH = 0. These tell us whether the
variable in question affected the HOUSE or UDALL bills in the same
manner as it affected the CONFERENCE bill. Acceptance of the null
hypothesis Pu = 0 or ru = 0 implies that this variable had the same effect on
how a congressman voted on UDALL as on CONFERENCE. Rejection of
the null hypothesis implies that the variable affected the way the congressman voted on the two bills differently. Similar interpretations hold for the
HOUSE parameters. For example, we expect the environmental variables
to have a larger positive value in the UDALL vote than in the CONFERENCE vote (i.e., Pu > 0 or ru > 0) and on the CONFERENCE vote more than
on the HOUSE vote (i.e., PH < 0 or YH < 0) since in each comparison the
environmental land withdrawal is larger.
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B. Empirical Results
The econometric models for equations (1) and (3) were estimated
using probit,1 u while equation (2) was estimated using ordinary least
squares (except for TAPS-NEPA, where it was estimated using probit, since
the index is either a zero or one). Table 2 presents the estimation results for
the three voting index scores and for the TAPS-NEPA vote. The dependent
variable in each of the voting indexes is the percentage of times a congressman voted in the manner preferred by the index rating organization. For
example, the LCV score is the percentage of times a congressman voted
with the environmental interests in votes selected by that organization. The
Owens amendment to the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Act would have deleted
language exempting TAPS from preparing an environmental impact
statement subject to the requirements in NEPA. Thus a "no" vote supports
the position of the oil companies. The t-tests of the null hypothesis, that the
8, parameters are equal to zero, are reported in parentheses below the
coefficients.
1. Ratings Indexes and the TAPS Vote
The ratings index regressions in columns (1)-(3) of table 2 show
that Republicans have lower LCV and ADA ratings but higher NTU
ratings. A larger margin of victory in the 1970 election lowers the ratings
index for each rating, as does seniority. Both of these results suggest that
congressmen with more secure positions are less beholden to the interest
groups constructing the ratings indexes. Congressmen in districts with
high population density, high membership in environmental organizations,
low population growth rates, high urban and black populations, and low
voter preferences for Nixon in the 1968 elections all have higher LCV and
ADA ratings and lower NTU ratings than their colleagues.
The vote on the Owens amendment eliminating the NEPA
exemption to TAPS in column (4) shows that congressmen with large
margins in the 1970 election and seniority were more inclined to vote "no"
(which was recorded as a one) in support of the oil companies. However,
party affiliation did not appear to affect voting behavior. Surprisingly,
constituent membership in environmental organizations and fuel production also had little effect on congressional voting.' Congressmen with high
union membership in their state were less likely to vote to eliminate the

184. Since the error structure is not specified by theory, we also ran the models using logit.
The signs and significance of the results are consistent with those reported. These results are
available from the authors upon request
185. These results could be because these variables are statewide measures rather than
district-specific measures.
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NEPA exemption, even though the unions supported the pipeline.
Additionally, congressmen with comparatively larger Native American
populations in their districts voted more in line with the oil companies than
with the environmentalists, suggesting that the Natives compromised with
the oil companies in the joint passage of ANCSA and the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline Act. An increase in the proportion of the LCV and ADA indexes
unexplained by constituency variables decreased the chance that congressmen would have voted "no" on deleting the NEPA exemption from the
Trans-Alaska Pipeline Act.L The residual from the Trans-Alaska Pipeline
Act equation is treated as a measure of support for the policy positions of
the oil companies who wanted to develop the North Slope oil fields.
2. Interest Group Competition and ANCSA Voting in the House
Table 3 presents the results from probit estimation of equations (1)
and (3). The variables used in these regressions are a subset of the variables
used in table 2. We originally estimated probit models for the combined
votes (reported in column (1) of table 3) and for each vote separately, using
all of the variables included in table 2 plus dummy variables for the nine
Census Bureau regions. Variables retained in the final model reported in
table 3 are those variables which were either significant in any one of the
earlier regressions or which were important for the specific interest group
hypotheses we wished to test. Column (1) contains the estimation results
when all three votes are pooled and the slope coefficients are restricted to
being equal across votes. Columns (2)-(4) report the estimation results by
vote when the votes are pooled, but the slope coefficients are allowed to
differ across votes. The slope coefficients for the UDALL amendment
(column (3)) and for the HOUSE bill (column (4)) measure the difference
between the slope coefficient in the CONFERENCE equation and the
UDALL or HOUSE equation, respectively. As in table 2, the t-statistics to
test the null hypothesis that the P, y,or 6 parameters are not statistically
different from zero are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. In
addition, the values in square brackets under column (3) and (4) respectively also report Wald chi-square statistics, which test the null hypothesis
that Pc +PH=,Pc+Pu ,yc ,c + n =O, or 'c+ru =O. These test
whether the slope coefficient for that particular vote is different from zero.
Consider first the regression estimates in column (1) where the
slope coefficients are restricted to be equal for each of the three votes.
Republicans were less likely to vote "yes" on all three bills than Democrats,
as were congressmen with a large NTU index residual (i.e., fiscal conserva-

186. We included the LCV, ADA, and NTU residuals in the TAPSNEPA equation since
this index was being created on the basis of a single vote. Thus, we wanted to take out any
effects preferences these other dimensions may have had upon the vote.
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tives) and congressmen from districts with*high population growth
between 1960 and 1970. Congressmen from states with larger per capita
membership in environmental organizations were more likely to vote
"yes," as were congressmen from districts with high median family
incomes. In addition, an increase in the amount of environmental land
withdrawn decreased the odds that a congressman would vote for the
ANSCA bills. In contrast, an increase in the size of the Native monetary
settlement increased the odds a congressman would vote affirmatively. The
LCV index residual, the TAPS-NEPA vote residual, and the union
membership variables had no statistically measurable effect on the way in
which congressmen voted on the three ANSCA bills.
Consider next the estimates in columns (2)-(4) where we allow the
slope coefficients to differ across votes. Republicans were less likely to
support CONFERENCE, but more likely to support both the UDALL
amendment and the HOUSE version of the bill. Environmental membership significantly affected only the UDALL amendment, but as expected,
the coefficient is positive. Thus, congressmen's votes were not influenced
by environmentalists except on the UDALL amendment. It is also
interesting that the Native American population percentage did not affect
the HOUSE or CONFERENCE bills, but negatively affected the UDALL
amendment. This result is consistent with the positions taken by the Alaska
Federation of Natives on the UDALL amendment. Congressmen with a
large positive LCV residual were less likely to vote for the CONFERENCE
or HOUSE votes, but more likely to vote for the UDALL amendment. This
result is as expected, if in fact it captures an inherent pro-environmental
ideology. Congressmen with a large, positive, unexplained portion of their
National Taxpayer's Union score were less likely to support either the
CONFERENCE or the HOUSE bills, but more likely to support the UDALL
amendment (although the test results are mixed in this case). A positive
residual from the amendment to delete the NEPA exemption of TAPS
means that congressmen were more likely to support the oil industry than
expected. A congressman with a larger TAPS-NEPA residual is more likely
to support the CONFERENCE or HOUSE vote and less likely to support
the UDALL amendment (although the tests are somewhat mixed on the
HOUSE bill and UDALL amendment)."7 Finally, we note that the effects
on the environmental land and Native monetary settlement in column (3)

187. The data could not reject the null hypothesis that Pc + Pu = 0, Pc + Pm = 0, or that PH
=
= PC but did reject the hypothesis that Pc Pu. Thus the TAPS (NEPA) residual had a different
effect in the UDALL vote from the CONFERENCE vote, but the TAPS (NEPA) residual may
have had no effect on the UDALL and HOUSE votes.

Fall 19991

THE ALASKA NATIVE LAND CLAIMS SETTLEMENT ACT

791

have the same sign as in column (1), although the significance level has
dropped slightly in each case.'
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this article we have examnned the legal and legislative history of
the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971. Our main objective has
been to analyze the role that interest group competition played in the
settlement. A combined historical and statistical analysis reveals that
environmentalists and the oil industry significantly affected the outcome.
Unfortunately, we were not able to statistically estimate the influence of the
DOI on the settlement. However, as their interests paralleled environmentalists' interests, it is dear that the DOI also influenced the final settlement. It
is also interesting to note the role interested individuals played in the
outcome.
While it is not possible in this context to statistically measure the
effect of the different DOI Secretaries, it is clear that the change in
leadership in late 1970 (when Morton replaced Hickel) profoundly affected
ANSCA. Economists, as a rule, place little emphasis upon the role of the
individual The historical analysis suggests that this may be at their peril.
With regard to the Native Alaskans themselves, we find little
evidence that they had an effect on congressional voting as individual
constituents. Evidence in support of the hypothesis that the Natives had
little effect on the outcome is that the settlement did not occur until after oil
had been discovered and after the State's land selections came to a halt.
Prior to these events, Congress was unwilling to address Native land
claims issues. However, there is reason to doubt that our measure of the
effect of Native constituencies (i.e., the percent of the Native American
population in a congressional district) is an accurate measure of the impact
they had upon the legislation, since the number of districts with anything
other than negligible percentages of Native Americans was and remains
quite small.
We hope that our analysis is of interest to historians and legal
scholars as well as those interested in aboriginal and environmental policy.
It is our belief that this article demonstrates the advantages of combining
rigorous historical analysis with an equally rigorous statistical analysis of
congressional behavior. We also hope to have made a contribution to the
study of congressional voting behavior. Our analysis of the different House
votes utilized differences in the matters being voted upon to measure the

188. However, each variable is statistically significant in both models.
189. Examples where this is made explicit Include Becker, supra note 168; Weingast &
Marshall, supra note 112.
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preferences of Congress. In addition, we also made use of the residuals
from votes on matters where the interests of oil companies appear to be
clear in order to obtain an instrumental variable to proxy congressional

support for that position. We believe further research concerning Alaskan
Native land claims should focus on the legislative battles over the TransAlaska Pipeline and the Alaska National Interest Land Conservation Act.
Although we have taken a small step in that direction in this article, there
is much left to do.
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Table 1: Properties of Major Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act Bills
1967-70
Bill
S. 1964 (Dept. of
Interior-Udall, June
16, 1967)

Legislative

Native

Environmental

Outcome

Settlement

Land

Died in Senate
Interior Committee

Ten million
acres held in
trust by Dept. of

None

Interior

S. 2690 (Alaska
Federation of Natives,
Nov. 22, 1968)

Died in Senate
Interior Committee

Claims can be
heard by court
of claims, no

"Land freeze"
extended for 3
years

limit

S. 2906 (State Native
Claims Task Force, Feb.

Died in Senate
Interior Committee

None

million

1, 1968)

S. 3586 (Dept. of
Interior-Udall, April
30, 1968)

Forty million
acres, $25

Died in Senate
Interior Committee

Ten million
acres held in
trust by Dept. of

None

Interior

S. 3041/ H. 14212
(Alaska Federation of
Natives, Oct. 16, 1969)

Died in Senate
Interior
Committee/Died in
House Indian
Affairs

Forty million
acres, $500
million

None

12.5 million
acres, $500
million

None

Ten million
acres, $1 billion

Withdrawals
do not affect
State
Selections or

Subcommittee

S. 1830 / H. 13142
(Dept. of Interior's
substitute--Hickel)

Died in Senate
Interior
Committee/Died in
House Indian
Affairs
Subcommittee

S. 1830 (Senate Interior
Committee, as reported)

Reported June 11,
1970 by Senate
Interior Committee

Pipeline

S. 1830 (as passed by
the Senate)

Passed by Senate
76-8, July 15, 1970

Ten million
acres, $1 billion

Withdrawals
do not affect
State
Selections or
Pipeline
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Table I (continued)
Bill
H. 13142 (Dept. of
Interior-Hickel, July
25, 1969)
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Legislative
Outcome

Native
Settlement

Environmental
Land

Died in House
Interior Indian
Affairs

Nine million
acres, $500
million

Withdrawals
do not affect
State

Selections or

Subcommittee

Pipeline
S.35 (As introduced in
Senate Interior
Committee, 1971)

Amended in
Senate Interior
Committee

Ten million
acres, $1 billion
(same as S.
1830, 1970)

All land
withdrawn for
five years

S.35 (As reported by
Senate Interior
Committee, 1971)

Reported by
Senate Interior

A. forty million
acres villages or
B. 25 villages &
ten elsewhere

All land
withdrawn, but
state land
selections
allowed

S. 35 (Bible
Amendment)

Passed by Senate
by voice vote,
Nov. 1, 1971

Same as S. 35

Withdrawals
got precedence
over State land
selections

S. 35 (as passed by the
Senate, 1971)

Passed Senate

Ten million
acres, $1,000
million

Withdrawals
got precedence
over State land
selections

H. 3100
(Haley/Aspinal, April
27, 1971)

Died in House
Interior's Indian
Affairs
Subcommittee

1-3 plus forty
million acres
subsistence, $1
billion

None
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Table 2: Ratings Index Regressions (OLS) and NEPA Exemption for
TAPS Vote (Probit)

1970 LCV

Equation

1970 ADA

TAPS

1973 NTU

(NEPA)

Coefficient

Coefficient

Coefficient

Coefficient

b(tratio)

b(t ratio)

b(t ratio)

b(t-ratio)

(1)
-32.782

(2)
-3.373

(3)
10.675

(4)
0.1807

R***(.19.38)

***(-23.44)

***(11.43)

(1.640)

-0.0224

-0.0591

-0.051

0.0035

(-0.766)

**(-2.397)

***(-3.058)

*(1.761)

-0.4604
***(-5.785)
2.0485
Green Membership per
1000 Adults___________

-0.6491
***(.9.695)
2.6840

-0.2791
***(-5.784)
-1.1001

0.0213
***(3.783)
-0.0307

***(4.370)

***(6.806)

***(-4.257)

-0.2719

-0.1827

0.6432

Variable
Republican (Rep. = 1,
Dem. = 0)

Margin in 1970
Election (Percent)
Seniority (Years)

1000_Adults

Native Americans
(Percent)
(Percent)

(xl00)______
___

Median Age
Population / mile 2
Union (Percent)
Population Change
(Percent)
(Percent)

Urban (Percent)
Median Income

($1000)

_____

(-1.029)

0.2144
_____

______

(0.672)

Fuel Production
___

_

-5.6441

(-0.537)

***(2.889)

***(2.719)

-1.511

0.3338

-0.0532

____________

***(-1.350)

***(.4.229)

(1.368)

(-1.406)

-0.1662
(-0.632)
0.0884

0.1347
(0.609)
0.2131

0.29608
**(2.063)
-0.0697

-0.0596
***(.3.506)
-0.0055

(1.617)

***(4.632)

**(-2.325)

(-1.609)

-0.9755
**(-2.419)
-0.2151

0.5309
(1.565)
-0.1965

-0.1728
(-0.763)
0.0788

-0.0653
**(-2.508)
0.0032
(0.953)

____________

***(4.079)

***(-4.428)

***(2.689)

-0.0017
(-0.05661)
3.6361

0.1549
***(6.008)
3.0466

-0.0042
(-0.247)
0.1850

__________

***(5.755)

***(5.730)

_-

(0.524)
(0.524)

-0.0036
*(-1.71 1)
-0.0722
1___6_90__
*(-1.690)
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Table 2 (continued)
Equation

1970 LCV

[Vol. 39

1970 ADA

1973 NTU

TAPS

0.0725

0.0669

0.0030
(0,347)

____________(NEPA)

Blue Collar (Percent)
Black (Percent)
Nixon Vote 1968
(Percent)
Federal Expenditures

0.0453
(0.356)

(0.656)

(0.919)

-0.2574
00(-3.609)

-0.2224
***(-3.706)

0.9691

**(2.474)

-0.0042

-0.4821

0.1083

0.3639

***(-4 083)

***(-5.703)

**(!.950)

***(5.140)

-0.34516

-0.3541

*(0.208)

*(-I.707)

-4.1646

-4.8017

0.1527

**(3.341)

(xl000)
-(-1.334)
LCV Residual

*(-!.828)

-0.0165
***(-6.148)

-

ADA Residual
NTU Residual
Number of
Observations
(OLS) / Maddala le
(probit)
F-Test (OLS) / LLR
Test (probit)
A2

-

-0.0088
1 ***(-3.020)
0.0062
(1.539)

-

-

-

421

421

362

411

0.666

0.333

0.307

***98.064

**22.346

**451.939

0.540
III
***58.027

Notes: Regional dummies, constant, and variables not significant in any regression
(median education, suburban percentage) are not reported. bThe TAPS-NEPA vote is
coded as a one if the member voted "no," which is in support of the oil companies, and
zero otherwise. Estimated by probit. eRejection of the null hypothesis in a two-tail test
at the following confidence levels: 1% (***) 5% (**) 10% (*).
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Table 3: Probit Regression Estimation of ANCSA House Votes
Equation

COMBINED
•I
VOTES

Coefficient
(t-ratio)
Variable'
(1)
Restricted Slo e Coefficients
Republican
-0.3751
(Rep. = 1, Dem.
***(-3.566)

_
___________

Green
Membership per
1000 Adults

Native
Americans
(Percent)

Fuel Production

(xl00)

Population per

CONFERENCE

UDALL

HOUSE

Coefficient • o
ent
(t-rato)
(t-ratio)
(t-ratio)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Unrestricted Slope Coefficients
-1.2838
1.622
0.5553
***(-5.373)

***(5.639)

*(1.771)

**[4.435]

***[12.577]

0.0566

0.0629

-0.0385

•**(3.254)

(1.178)

(1.080)
**W[1_3.192]

(-0.607)
[0.1901

-0.0078

0.8107

-0.9374

-1.7507

(-0.209)

(1.402)

*(-1.607)
• [2.750]

(-1.280)

-0.1978

-0.0459

-0.0013

0.0749

(-1.142)

(-1.304)

_________

0.0680

[0.381]

(-0.269)

(1.390)

• [2.804]

[0.504]

0.0010

0.0029

-0.0021

-0.0005

(0.369)

(0.376)

(-0.294)

(-0.063)

[0.0021

[0.116]

Square Mile

Union (Percent)

Population
Change

(Perent)____

Urban (Percent)

0.0068

0.0010

0.0158

0.0264

(0.404)

(0.027)

(0.354)
[0.406]

(0.541)
[0.690]

-0.0061

-0.0076

-0.0019

0.0057

• (-1.879)

(-1.083)

(-0.217)

(0.601)

• [3.325]

[0.092]

-0.0097
**(-!.l992)

-0.0029
(-0.537)

[0.254]

[2.414]

0.0017
(1.075)

0.0084
*(2.009)
4-
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COMBINED

HOUSE

Table 3 (continued)

Equation

CONFERENCE

VOTES

Variable £

Coefficient
(t-ratio)
(1)

Restricted Slo e Coefficients
Median Family

UDALL
________

Coefficient
(t-ratio)
(2)

Coefficlent
(t-ratio)
(3)

O~oeiient
(t-ratlo)
(4)

Unrestricted Slope Coefficients

0.6371

10.5480

**(2.0056)

(1.493)

0.0456

-0.1290

(0.053)

(-1.367)

**[5.182]

[0.141]

Income ($1000)

LCV Residual

ADA Residual

NTU Residual

0.0041

-0.0015

0.0136

(1,548)

(-0.257)

*(!.887)

(-0.025)

***[8.6381

[0.062]

0.0061

0.0050

0.0059

-0.0032

**(2.034)

(0.738)

(0.718)
**[5.528

(-0.358)
[o.0811

-0.0216

-0.0417

0.0433

-0.0001

***(-4.462)

***(3.716)

(-0.069)

[0.05]

***[22.594]

0.1396

0.5868

-0.7138

-0.2957

(1.219)

**(2.295)

**(-2.308)

(-0.852)

[0.532]

[1.539]

***(-5.087)

TAPS-NEPA

-0.0020

Residual

Environmental
Land

-0.0102

'-0.0262

***(-11.540)

***(-5.132)

0.0220

e0.0331

***(7.876)

**(2.002)

1094

'366

***282.774

9**'416.586

_

_

Withdrawals

Native
Monetary

_

_

Settlement

Number of

'368

r3 60

Observations

Log-Likelihood
Ratio Test

Notes: ' Constant and missing value dummy for NTU and TAPS-NEPA not reported.
bDifference in Udall-Saylor or House coefficient and Conference Bill coefficient.
cRejection of the null hypothesis 0, = 0, 0 =,8, y, 8, = H, C, U, in a two-tail test at
the following confidence levels: 1% (***) 5% (**) 10% (*). dWald Chi-Squared
tests of the null hypothesis that oc + OH = 0 or 0c + ) = 0, 0=,8, y. ' Estimated from
the probit model (3) including all three votes combined. r Observations per vote (total
observations = 1094).

